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Deutsche Zusammenfassung 
 
Zwischen 1975 und Januar 1979 wurden im damaligen kommunistischen 
Kambodscha durch die herrschende Khmer Rouge Verbrechen gegen die 
Menschlichkeit begangen. Nach der Befreiung (oder der Invasion) Kambodschas 
durch Vietnam im Januar 1979 wurde ein mögliches Genozidverfahren zum 
Hauptthema der neuen (pro Vietnam) Regierung.  Erst im Jahr 2011 wurde der 
ehemalige Leiter des S-21s (Sicherheitsgefängnis) Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch zur 
35 Jahren Haft für Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit verurteilt. Das Tribunal ist 
das erste, international anerkannte Tribunal für die Khmer Rouge In Kambodscha. In 
dieser Arbeit wurde die Suche nach Justiz in Kambodscha zwischen 1979 und 2011 
betrachtet.  
 
In den 90er Jahren, nach dem Kalten Krieg, wurde die liberale Demokratie zum 
bevorzugten politischen System aufgrund des 'Sieges' Amerikas im Kalten Krieg. 
Damit wurde ,transitional justice' als Lösung für ehemalige kommunistischen Länder, 
die sich zur Demokratie umwandeln wollten oder sollten, populär. ,Transitional 
justice' verbindet das traditionelle Tribunal mit anderen Methoden z.B. 
Wahrheitskommissionen oder Entschädigungen und versucht Justiz für die Opfer des 
ehmaligen autoritären Regimes zu bekommen ohne den Umstieg (Transition) zur 
Demokratie zu stören. Dieses Konzept wurde in Kambodscha nur mit beschränkten 
Erfolg angewendet.  
 
Im ersten Teil dieser Arbeit wurden die bisherigen angewendeten ,transitional justice' 
Methoden genau untersucht. Im zweiten Teil wurde der Zustand der 
kambodschanischen Demokratie analysiert um festzustellen, ob ,transitional justice' 
den Umstieg zur Demokratie verhindert oder verbessert hat. Im letzten Teil wurde die 
Politik Kambodschas im internationalen, regionalen und nationalen Kontext 
dargestellt um zu zeigen wie sehr die kambodschanische Politik von der Politik des 
Kalten Krieges und der ,neuen liberalen Ära' beeinflusst wurde und wird. Das Ziel 
dieser Arbeit ist es die ,Erfolge' und ,Fehler' von ,transitional justice' in Kambodscha 
ausführlich darzustellen.  
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Bis jetzt kann die Durchführung von ,transitional justice' in Kambodscha nicht als 
erfolgreich eingeschätzt werden. Die Demokratie ist immer noch brüchig, 
Menschenrechte und politische Rechte werden nicht respektiert. Studien zeigen, 
dass die Opfer des Khmer Rouge Regimes noch nicht bereit sind, die Vergangenheit 
zu vergessen und den Tätern zu verzeihen. Die Regierung zeigt keine Bereitschaft 
andere ,transitional justice' Methoden außer dem jetzigen Verfahren offiziell zu 
unterstützen. Die Zivilgesellschaft und NGOs in Kambodscha haben in der letzten 
Zeit Fortschritte gemacht, darunter Wahrheitskommissionen und Genozidbildung. 
Aber ohne Unterstützung der Regierung und das nötige Geld können sie diese 
Erfolge nicht auf das gesamte Staatsgebiet ausweiten.  
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Introduction 
 
"Out of our memory...of the Holocaust we must forge an unshakeable oath with all 
civilized people that never again will the world stand silent, never again will the 
world...fail to act in time to prevent this terrible crime of genocide....we must harness 
the outrage of our own memories to stamp out oppression wherever it exists. We 
must understand that human rights and human dignity are indivisible."1 
 
In September 1979, United States President Jimmy Carter told the President's 
Commission on the Holocaust that the civilised world should 'never again' 
stand by and let genocide happen. However, between 17th April 1975 and 7th 
January 1979, the civilised world had done just that as the Khmer Rouge committed 
some of the  "most brazen atrocities since the Third Reich" against its own citizens.2 
The number of Cambodians that perished under the Khmer Rouge regime is still 
debated, but most estimates place the number at around 1.7 million.3 After the fall of 
Phnom Penh to the Vietnamese on 7th January 1979, the Khmer Rouge no longer 
had de facto control of the country. However, they still continued to represent 
Cambodia at the United Nations until the end of the Cold War. Throughout the 1990s, 
the crimes of 1975-9 went unpunished. This impunity continued until 2005, when the 
Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) were opened to put 
senior Khmer Rouge leaders on trial for their crimes.  
 
This thesis will analyse the attempts to gain justice for millions of Cambodians who 
were either killed, had relatives and friends killed or were physically or 
psychologically harmed by the Khmer Rouge regime. Justice attempts, or lack 
thereof, made before 1991 will be viewed through a Cold War lens, without which 
                                            
1 Jimmy Carter, Remarks at the Presentation of the Final Report of the President's 
Commission on the Holocaust, September 27, 1979.  
2 Maguire, P.H., Facing Death in Cambodia, Columbia University Press (2005), p2.  
3 See Kiernan, Ben, The Pol Pot Regime , Yale University Press (2002), p458 for an 
estimate of 1,671,000. Michael Vickery has estimated a much lower 740,000, see: 
Vickery, Michael, 'How Many Died in Pol Pot's Kampuchea?', BCAS, Vol 20, No. 1, 
pp70-73. This has since been discredited due to a low 1975 population estimate. 
Despite the debate about the figure, the Yale University Cambodian Genocide 
Project continue to use the 1.7 million estimate, see: www.yale.edu/cgp accessed 
on 14th June 2011.   
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international politics regarding post-genocide Cambodia would not make sense to a 
twenty-first century observer. Attempts at justice made after the end of the Cold War 
will be viewed within the context of democratisation.  
Pre-Khmer Rouge Cambodia 
Before the genocide and attempts at genocide justice in Cambodia can be fully 
understood, it is necessary to understand how the Khmer Rouge were able to take 
power in 1975. In order to do this, it is important to understand Cambodia's socio-
political climate as well as its the position in regional and international politics before 
1975.  
 
Cambodia gained independence from France in 1953 and throughout the 1950s and 
1960s the country was ruled by King Sihanouk. 4 William Shawcross describes 
Sihanouk as presiding feudally over Cambodia as, "King, Chief of State, Prince, 
Prime Minister, head of the main political movement, jazz-band leader, magazine 
editor, film director and gambling concessionaire".5 After criticism of the monarchy's 
involvement in politics from the International Control Commission and Cambodian 
opposition leader Son Ngoc Thanh, Sihanouk abdicated in 1955 in order to 
circumnavigate criticism of his involvement in politics and run as a politician.6 Using 
his charisma and promises of a democratic government, Sihanouk won the 1955 
elections.7 
 
At the beginning of his time in office, Sihanouk used a policy of 'extreme neutrality', 
involving pitting Cambodia's neighbours against each other, which was not well 
received outside of Cambodia.8 The United States in particular disliked the extreme 
neutrality policy, characterised by Prime Minister Penn Nouth when he said, 
"Although we are not Communists, we do not oppose Communism as long as the 
                                            
4 Throughout this thesis King Sihanouk is refered to as 'King Sihanouk',or simply 
Sihanouk, although he was officially Prince Sihanouk between 2nd March 1955 and 
24th September 1993. Sihanouk once again became King on 24th September 1993 
and reigned until his abdication on 7th October 2004. To avoid confusion the term 
King is used throughout.  
5 Shawcross, William, Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia, 
Andre Deutsch, London (1979), p46.  
6 Shawcross, William (1979), p49 
7 Shawcross, William (1979), p49 
8 Shawcross, William (1979), p51 
  8 
latter is not imposed on our people from the outside", shortly after independence in 
1953.9 William Shawcross contests that the United States pursued a policy of 
interference in Cambodia to convince susceptible sectors of society of Chinese 
interference in Cambodian society and Sihanouk's inefficiency and corruption in order 
to "win them to the free world".10 
 
In 1963, Sihanouk's policy shifted to the left, which led to the United States branding 
Cambodia "pro-communist".11 Sok Udum Deth argues that this move was triggered 
by a belief that the communists would eventually win the Indochina War and also by 
a mistrust of South Vietnam and Thailand, two countries that enjoyed US backing.12 
William Shawcross attributes the shift to Sihanouk's suspicion that his conservative 
army generals were becoming too "dependent upon both American aid and American 
attitudes".13 In 1963, Sihanouk cut off economic and military aid from the United 
States (totalling $404 million between 1953 and 1963), nationalised banks and 
export-import trade.14 This was followed by the breaking off of political relations with 
the United States in 1965.  
 
The break in relations with the United States meant that Cambodia had to court North 
Vietnamese and Chinese aid, In order to do this, Sihanouk made a 'secret pact' with 
the North Vietnamese and Chinese, which allowed the Chinese, Soviets and Czechs 
to use Cambodia to supply Vietnamese communists.15David Chandler states that the 
terms of the secret alliance with North Vietnam allowed Vietnamese troops to be 
stationed on Cambodian soil and the Chinese and North Vietnamese to use the port 
of Sihanoukville to provide these troops with arms and food.16  In exchange, the 
North Vietnamese agreed to respect Cambodia's borders, leave Cambodians in 
                                            
9 Shawcross, William (1979), p52 
10 Shawcross, William (1979), p56.  
11 See Chandler, David, A History of Cambodia, Westview Press, Sydney (1992), 
p192.  
12 Deth, S, 'The Geopolitics of Cambodia during the Cold War Period', The Journal of 
Explorations, University of Hawaii Press, Manoa, Vol 9 (Spring 2009) pp47-53.  
13 Shawcross, William (1979), p60 
14 Deth, S  (2009), p47 
15 Morris, Stephan J., Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia: Political CUlture and the 
Causes of War, Stanford University Press, California (1999), p41 
16 Chandler (1992) p194.  
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peace and avoid skirmishes with Cambodian troops.17 The United States and South 
Vietnamese were, of course, aware and angered of the presence of North 
Vietnamese troops and arms in Cambodia.18 This resulted the bombing of Cambodia 
(beginning with Operation Breakfast on 18th March 1969), in which US planes 
dropped approximately 540,000 tonnes of bombs and killed between 150,000-
750,000 Cambodian civilians (estimates vary).19  
 
The urban elite, including Sino-Cambodian businessmen and Cambodian 
bureaucrats and army officers, began to turn away from the Sihanouk government. 
Even members of his own government, including Prime Minister Lon Nol, were 
vocally anti-Sihanouk.20 In June 1969, Sihanouk attempted to shore up his hold on 
power by renewing diplomatic relations with the United States, but this failed to have 
the desired effect. On 18th March 1970, the National Assembly of Cambodia voted 
unanimously to remove King Sihanouk from power.21 The Khmer Republic was 
proclaimed and it nominated General Lon Nol as its Prime Minister. There was public 
support for this move, especially among the educated classes, but David Chandler 
suggests this support was the result of wanting the North Vietnamese out of 
Cambodia, rather than intellectual support for the Lon Nol government.22 Lon Nol's 
government ordered the North Vietnamese troops to leave Cambodia, but this order 
was not obeyed.  
 
Since returning from Paris in the late 1950s, the leaders of the Khmer Rouge 
(including Pol Pot and Ieng Sary) had been hiding in the Cambodian countryside and 
forming a Cambodian communist party. The Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) 
was founded in 1960 and spent the majority of the 1960s in hiding in the Cambodian 
countryside, gaining support among the disenchanted rural classes. It was in this 
period; Sihanouk nicknamed the CPK 'Khmer Rouge'.23 In 1968, Khmer Rouge 
forces clashed with Sihanouk and Lon Nol's troops.  David Chandler suggests the 
                                            
17 Chandler (1992), p194.  
18 Chandler (1992), p194.  
19 Tully, John, A Short History of Cambodia : From Empire to Survival, Allen and 
Unwin, New South Wales (2005), p. 167.  
20 Shawcross, William (1979), p67 
21 Shawcross, William (1979), p121 
22 Chandler (1992).  
23 Shawcross, William (1979), p245 
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majority of these clashes were provoked by Sihanouk and Lon Nol, in order to justify 
retaliation against the communists.24 At this point, the Khmer Rouge was closely 
affiliated with the North Vietnamese communists, and was able to seek shelter on 
Vietnamese soil.  
 
After Lon Nol ousted King Sihanouk, he formed the Front Uni National du 
Kampuchea (FUNK), a united front with the Khmer Rouge. Ben Kiernan asserts that 
this united front was formed at the request of the Vietnamese communist party, who 
wanted the combine the two parties with significant rural support bases to mobilise 
Khmer peasant support for a revolution.25 On the other hand, Shawcross states that it 
was the Khmer Rouge that approached Sihanouk, and that by forming an alliance 
they achieved, "national and international identity and appeal".26  
 
Whatever the reason for the Sihanouk-Khmer Rouge alliance, the harmony between 
the Cambodian and Vietnamese communist parties did not last until the revolution 
took place in 1975.  David Chandler argues that after 1971 the Khmer Rouge 
became more self confident, resentful of Vietnamese leadership and started to 
operate under a motto of 'Cambodia for the Cambodians'.27 In 1973, the North 
Vietnamese signed a ceasefire with the Americans that meant they would have to 
draw Vietnamese troops from Cambodia. The Khmer Rouge rejected the Vietnamese 
plea to observe the ceasefire, seeing it as a betrayal and believing they could 
overthrow Lon Nol alone. From this point on, Khmer Rouge forces were fighting Lon 
Nol and carrying out small attacks on any remaining Vietnamese soldiers in 
Cambodia.  
 
On 17th April 1975, Khmer Rouge forces entered Phnom Penh and declared a 
revolution. Within days, all cities were evacuated, schools, hospitals, libraries and 
monasteries were closed, and money, clocks and reading glasses were banned. 
Angkar, 'the organisation' replaced religion or family as the 'caregiver' in Cambodian 
daily life and human communication was kept to a minimum. Ben Kiernan writes, "a 
                                            
24 Chandler, David, Brother Number One: a political biography of Pol Pot, Westview 
Press, Boulder Colorado (1992), p84.  
25 Kiernan, Ben, The Pol Pot Regime: race, power and genocide in Cambodia under 
the Khmer Rouge 1975-9, Yale University Press, New Haven (2002), p15.  
26 Shawcross, William (1979), p246 
27 Chandler, David, Brother Number One (1992), 95.  
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whole nation was kidnapped and then besieged from within".28 Cambodia was to 
remain this way until January 1979.  
How did the Khmer Rouge gain power?  
One school of historiographical support suggests that the Cold War and external 
ideological influences led to the rise of the Khmer Rouge.29 Ben Kiernan argues, 
"although it was indigenous, Pol Pot's revolution would not have won power without 
U.S. economic and military destabilisation of Cambodia".30 He states the US 
bombing of Cambodia between 1970 and 1973 created a refugee class that were 
susceptible to the revolutionary propaganda of the Khmer Rouge.31 To support this 
argument, Kiernan quotes a 1979 interview with Chhit Do, a Khmer Rouge member 
who fled Cambodia in 1979. When asked if the US bombing helped the Khmer 
Rouge recruit supporters, he answered, "That was what made it so easy for the 
Khmer Rouge to win people over... It was because of their dissatisfaction with the 
bombing that they kept on cooperating with the Khmer Rouge, joining up with the 
Khmer Rouge, sending their children off to go with them".32 Therefore, this school of 
historiographical thought considers the US bombing of Cambodia to be the catalyst 
for the Khmer Rouge revolution in 1975.  
 
Another school of historiographical thought argues that socioeconomic conditions in 
Cambodia under Sihanouk and Lon Nol contributed more to the rise of the Khmer 
Rouge than international influences from the Vietnam War and the United States.33 
Cambodian culture before 1975 comprised of three major segments: the government 
bureaucracy; the Buddhist clergy and the peasantry. Matthew Edwards states that 
there were not enough positions of valued status for all of the people that fulfilled the 
criteria them, and this coupled with improvements in education in the 1950s and 60s 
led to increased unrest in the population.34 In addition to this, the numbers of landless 
peasants rose between 1950 and 1970. In 1961, the poorest 52% of the population 
                                            
28 Kiernan, Ben (2002), p8 
29 See Kiernan, Ben (2002) and Shawcross, William (1979).  
30 Kiernan, Ben (2002), p16.  
31 By 1971 there were 130,000 new Khmer refugees, of which 60% stated the US 
bombing as the main reason they were displaced. In Kiernan, Ben (2002), p19.  
32 Kiernan, Ben (2002), p23.  
33 See Edwards, Matthew, 'The Rise of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia: Internal or 
External Origins?', Asian Affairs, Vol 35, No. 1 (2004).  
34 Edwards, Matthew (2004), p59 
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owned 6% of the land and the richest 6% owned 39% of the land.35 These factors 
combined meant the Khmer Rouge could recruit from a wide base of dissatisfied rural 
workers with no ties to their villages and communities. From 1967 to 1973 Khmer 
Rouge guerrilla forces expanded from 2,500 to 60,000.36  
Khmer Rouge Ideology 
In 1983, Vietnamese war correspondent Than Tin drew comparisons between 
Maoism and Pol Pot's ideology: 
 
 "Pol Pot's ideology was the same as Mao- a simple method of thought; an  
 extreme point of view; an illusion without reality; subjectivist. They worshipped 
 the role of the peasant- the nature of the peasants- the poorer the more radical 
 and progressive.... They are anti-intellectual. They are religious in character- 
 their leaders are like God- for example Mao and Pol Pot. This is feudalist in 
 character. They believed that Maoism plus muscle equals success."37 
 
 Like the Maoist ideology of the Chinese Communist Party, the Khmer Rouge viewed 
the agricultural working class as the true proletariat. This was heavily influenced by 
Chinese Maoism, which departed from European influenced Marxism by 
emphasising the rural working class rather than the urban rural class. In K.D. 
Jackson’s 1978 assessment of the Khmer Rouge's propaganda (of which there was 
not a great amount) stated that the Khmer Rouge saw the dominance of the feudal 
landowners and city dwelling capitalist class as the root of all Cambodian problems.38 
 
David Chandler also argues "the most important intellectual [foreign] influence was 
probably the Cultural Revolution in China".39 Indeed, there are similarities between 
Cambodia under Pol Pot and China under Mao during the Cultural Revolution. Firstly, 
the Down to the Countryside Movement in China in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
                                            
35 Delvert, J, Le Paysan Cambodgien, Paris (1961), p594.  
36 Jackson, K.D., Cambodia 1977 : Gone to Pot', Asian Survey, Vol 18, no. 1 (1978), 
pp19-26 
37 Tin, Than, 'Notes of Discussion with Than Tin, Deputy Editor of Nhan Dan, Former 
Editor of Quan Doi Nhan Dan, War Correspondent, Colonel in the Vietnamese 
People's Army, Two Talks', Phnom Penh, Cambodia (1 June 1983), p28.  
38 Jackon, K.D (1978), p77.  
39 Chandler, David, Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot. Westview 
Press (1999), p66.  
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sent privileged young people to the countryside and to learn how to work is echoed in 
the evacuation of the cities in the first days and weeks of Khmer Rouge reign in 
1975.40 Secondly, Pol Pot's party showed equal lack of respect for cultural property 
and literature, as did the Maoists in China. It was forbidden for ordinary citizens to 
own clocks, books or reading glasses, and pagodas and cultural institutions (except 
Angkor Wat) were destroyed. David Chandler notes that Pol Pot was in China in the 
late 1960s and saw the Cultural Revolution in action, which is likely to have 
influenced him and his future plans.41  
 
One aspect of the Cultural Revolution that was used in Cambodia was the concept of 
personality cult. The Maoist personality cult has been widely reported and analysed, 
and as such will not be discussed in any depth here.42 In contrast to Chairman Mao, 
Pol Pot kept a low profile during the Khmer Rouge years. David Chandler writes, "no 
biography of Brother Number One [Pol Pot] was ever broadcast over Phnom Penh 
Radio or published in Tung Padevat. No photographs of him appeared in party 
literature. No anecdotes of his childhood, his teaching career, or his time in the 
maquis entered popular folklore via speeches at political meetings. There were no 
plays or songs about him and no 'published thoughts'".43 In short, the revolution in 
Cambodia and the whole Democratic Kampuchea movement was not tied to Pol Pot 
as a leader. Indeed, when the Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea was 
proclaimed in 1976, the Prime Minister was identified as 'Pol Pot', a rubber plantation 
worker.44 It was not until 1977 that Pol Pot was identified under his real name, Saloth 
Sar, from photographs that were taken of him in China.45 It was not until 1978 that 
Pol Pot allowed himself to be interviewed by journalists.46 Therefore, Pol Pot 
managed to keep such a low profile that his real identity was not even known until the 
third year of his rule in Democratic Kampuchea, and it wasn't until the last year of his 
rule that interviews with him began to be published. This is a sharp contrast to the 
                                            
40 Chandler, David (1999), p70 
41 Chandler, David (1999), p71.  
42 For more information on Mao's personality cult in China see: Schrift, Melissa, The 
Biography of a Chairman Mao Badge: The Creation and Mass Consumption of a 
Personality Cult, Rutgers University Press (2001)  
43 Chandler, David, Brother Number One (1992), p158 
44 Chandler, David, Brother Number One (1992), p194 
45 Chandler, David, Brother Number One (1992), p195 
46 Chandler, David, Brother Number One (1992), p195 
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red book waving, Mao badge toting personality cult that surrounded Chairman Mao 
during the Cultural Revolution in China.  
 
One of the reasons for the lack of personality cult could well have been the semi 
personality cult that surrounded Sihanouk during the 1950s and 1960s. While not as 
intricate as the personality cult surrounding Mao, Sihanouk managed to gain the 
support of the rural peasants by acting like a 'man of the people', "standing in village 
squares and mopping the sweat from his face as he swapped raucous jokes with the 
delighted peasantry".47 When the Khmer Rouge came to power, they kept Sihanouk 
as a figurehead of the movement, to represent Democratic Kampuchea to the United 
Nations and win the "mass support which the rhetoric of the revolution had failed to 
engender".48 Therefore, the Khmer Rouge already had a charismatic figure they 
could use as a figurehead, and didn't need to create a personality cult around Pol 
Pot.  
 
In addition to his Maoist ideology, Pol Pot also favoured ultra-nationalism, where the 
Khmer race would be freed of its Cham, Vietnamese and Chinese influences and 
Cambodia would regain the splendour it experienced in the Angkor period. Elisabeth 
Becker draws comparisons between Pol Pot's Cambodia and the Angkor King 
Jayavarman VII, who ruled in the twelfth century, arguing that traces of Khmer 
nationalism can be found during this period.49 Ben Kiernan states that Pol Pot 
"distorted and exaggerated the Chinese model just as he and his fellow communists 
drew on extremes of chauvinist and racist ideologies which had roots in traditional 
Khmer thinking".50 Therefore, Khmer Rouge ideology can be viewed as an uneasy 
mix of Maoism and nationalism, creating a genocidal regime, in which only rural 
peasants of Khmer descent were not vilified.  
The Khmer Rouge Legacy 
On 7th January 1979, the Vietnamese Army marched into Phnom Penh, proclaimed 
the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) and brought an end to over three years 
                                            
47 Shawcross, William (1979), p49 
48 Shawcross, William (1979), p247 
49 Elizabeth Becker, When the War Was Over: The Voices of Cambodia's Revolution 
and its People, New York, Simon and Schuster (1998) p200 
50 Ben Kiernan, "Why Pol Pot? Roots of the Cambodian Tragedy", Indochina  
Issues, No. 52, (December 1984), p3 
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of Khmer Rouge leadership in Cambodia. However, although the Khmer Rouge were 
physically removed from the capital city, their presence could be felt in Cambodia for 
decades afterwards.  
 
Although the Khmer Rouge no longer maintained control of Phnom Penh, they did 
still control parts of Cambodian territory up until the early 1990s.51 The co-existence 
of PRK and Khmer Rouge troops was not a peaceful one. The Khmer Rouge forces 
combined with the Khmer People's Liberation Front (comprised mainly of Lon Nol's 
supporters) and FUNCINPEC (comprised mainly of King Sihanouk's supporters) and 
continued a guerrilla war against the PRK forces from the jungle on the border with 
Thailand. This guerrilla coalition was transformed into a political coalition known as 
the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea on 22nd June 1982, and was 
recognised as the official government of Cambodia by the majority of Western and 
ASEAN countries.52 This is just one of the many Cold War influences on the 
Cambodian situation.  
 
The violence continued unchecked until the Paris Peace Accords in 1991, which 
aimed to promote democracy and human rights in Cambodia. In 1992, the United 
Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) started repatriating millions of 
refugees who had been living along the Thai-Cambodian border since 1979. In the 
1993 elections over 4 million Cambodians voted for a FUNCINPEC-Cambodian 
People's Party coalition.53 Since 1993, the road to democracy has not been without 
obstacles, including limited political freedom and factional infighting between the 
various components of the coalition. Cambodia remains a politically unstable country 
where respect for democracy and human rights is lacking.54 
Research Questions 
The ultimate aim of this thesis is to explore the extent the 'successes' or 'failures' of 
transitional justice in Cambodia. In order to do so, many other, smaller research 
questions must be answered. The first chapter will focus on the definitions of 
                                            
51 Vickery, Michael, Kampuchea: Politics, Economy and Society, Pinter Publishers, 
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52 Vickery, Michael (1986), p171.  
53 Morris, Stephan J. (1999), p226.  
54 The lack of democracy and human rights in Cambodia will be discussed in later 
chapters.  
  16 
democracy and, in particular, transitional justice. The second chapter will focus on 
the theoretical and methodological framework behind this thesis, considering the 
questions 'How can the success or failure of transitional justice be measured?' and 
'In which theoretical tradition does transitional justice operate?'.  This chapter will 
also contemplate which measurements transitional justice has to fulfil to be 
considered 'successful', and answer the question 'what is success in a transitional 
society?'. The third chapter will consider which transitional justice methods have 
been implemented already, with a special focus on tribunals and attempts to 
historicise the past. Following on from this, the fourth chapter will attempt to analyse 
the success or failure of the methods described in chapter three. In the concluding 
chapter, the apparent failures of transitional justice in Cambodia will be viewed 
through a national, regional and international lens.  
 
  17 
Definitions  
What is transitional justice? 
Laura McGrew sums up the move towards transitional justice by arguing, "As 
countries emerge from periods of armed conflict and mass violence they seek a 
balance between truth, justice, peace and reconciliation".55  
 
The concept of transitional justice gained popularity in the 1980s. Paige Arthur 
argues that the concept came directly out of interactions between human rights 
activists, lawyers, policymakers, donors, journalists and comparative politics experts 
concerned about human rights and the 'transition to democracy' in many of the 
formerly communist regimes.56 By definition, transitional justice is an interdisciplinary 
field that requires expertise from many different subject areas. Knowledge of law, 
history, politics, human rights and geography are all required to fully understand the 
transitional justice process.  
 
Unlike retributional justice, transitional justice seeks to balance the need to punish 
those responsible for crimes against humanity with the need to move towards a more 
stable future. Phil Clark defines six key concepts of transitional justice: reconciliation; 
peace; justice; healing; forgiveness and truth.57 
Reconciliation 
Clark defines reconciliation as, "the rebuilding of fractured individual and communal 
relationships after conflict, with a view to encouraging meaningful interaction and 
cooperation between the former antagonists".58 It means much more than just an end 
to conflict between two parties, instead focusing on how the two parties can rebuild 
                                            
55 McGrew, Laura, 'Transitional Justice Mechanisms', Justice Iniatitives : The 
Extraordinary Courts of Cambodia, Open Justice Society Iniatitive (Spring 2006), 
p140.  
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of Human Rights', Human Rights Quarterly, Vol 31, No.2 (2009), p324 
57 Clark, Phil, 'Establishing A Conceptual Framework: Six Key Transitional Justice 
Themes', in Clark and Kaufman (eds), After Genocide:Transitional Justice, Post-
Conflict Reconstruction and Reconciliation in Rwanda and Beyond, Hurst Publishers, 
London (2008), p191.  
58 Clark (2008), p194.  
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relationships and live harmoniously in the same society without risking further 
conflict.  
Peace 
Clark identifies two different types of peace: negative and positive.59 Negative peace 
follows a ceasefire or end to violent conflict and aims for the short-term shoring up of 
the new non-violent situation. Positive peace is a longer term, sustainable process in 
which the protagonists are encouraged to build mutual trust and requires "building 
deeper mechanisms in a community to ensure that combatants do not return to 
conflict".60 Positive peace usually follows negative peace.  
Justice 
Scholars also recognise two different types of justice: retributive and restorative. 
Retributive justice aims at punishing perpetrators of crimes, whatever the cost. Some 
authors believe that retributive justice is an essential part of transitional justice, 
because states have a legal obligation under international law (for example, the 
Genocide Convention) to pursue the conviction and punishment of perpetrators.61 
Diane Orentlicher suggests that a failure to prosecute the perpetrators of grave 
human rights violations sets an unhappy precedent for the future and "vitiates the 
authority of law itself, sapping its power to deter proscribed conduct".62 
 
Moreover, the failure of a new democracy to prosecute the human rights violations of 
a former regime may undermine the democracy itself, especially when the impunity is 
to appease the military or other remnants of the old regime. When the new 
democracy asserts its power by using civilian legal institutions to prosecute former 
regime members, it asserts its power over the old authoritarian regime. Indeed, Phil 
Clark (among others) suggests that the culture of impunity was a major factor in the 
Rwandan genocide, as political leaders were able to push the boundaries without 
being punished until they committed genocidal crimes.63 
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63 Clark, Phil (2008), p195.  
  19 
Restorative justice, unlike retributive justice, does not see criminal prosecution as the 
be all and end all of justice, but rather just as one tool in the justice toolbox. 
Restorative justice places importance of the reintegration of offenders into society 
and giving offenders the opportunity to rebuild relationships with their victims.  
 
Gerry Johnstone argues that restorative justice, "revolves around the idea that crime 
is, in essence, a violation of a person by another person (rather than a violation of 
legal rules); that in responding to a crime our primary concerns should be to make all 
offenders aware of the harm they have caused, to get them to understand and meet 
their liability to repair such harm, and to ensure that further offences are 
prevented".64 Restorative justice is usually undertaken as part of negotiated justice, 
where the community affected is involved in deciding who should be punished and 
how. This varies from formal justice, which is normally undertaken in a courtroom 
setting. In a transitional justice setting, both retributive and restorative justice could 
be of use.  
Healing 
In most transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy, especially where violent 
conflict was involved, victims often suffer from severe psychological, physical or 
emotional trauma. Mahmood Mamdani argues that the Hutu perception of 
themselves as victims in the twentieth century provided a foundation for the 
Rwandan genocide, as this helped them overcome their victim status.65 This 
comparison shows how important the concept of healing is to transitional justice, in 
order to prevent any future human rights violations.  
Forgiveness 
Clark suggests that the concept of forgiveness is one that is not often discussed, 
because of its religious connotations.66 Some critics argue that forgiveness is the 
complete opposite to punishment, urging survivors to "move on" and forget about 
what has happened. However, Clark suggests that forgiveness requires a (public) 
recognition of the crimes committed and the victims must be given the opportunity to 
                                            
64 Johnstone, Gerry, Restorative Justice: ideas, Values, Debates, Willian Publishing, 
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seek punishment for the perpetrators. Only then can the victims overcome the injury 
inflicted upon them and seek to restore the damaged relationships. However, 
forgiveness, unlike reconciliation, does not necessitate reconciliation of the parties.67 
Truth 
Clark identifies three phases to the truth process: truth telling; truth hearing and truth 
shaping.68 Truth telling can take place in a truth commission or as evidence in a 
tribunal. It is the public act of articulating the truth as the victim sees it. Truth hearing 
focuses on the reception of the truth being told in the truth telling phase. These two 
phases make up a whole in the post-conflict dialogue. Truth shaping is an exercise 
often undertaken by historians and politicians, who reinterpret the 'truth' for social or 
political gains.  
 
All of these six concepts are important when devising a transitional justice approach, 
and form the basis of the mechanisms used to administer transitional justice.  
What mechanisms are available for transitional justice situations? 
In order to achieve these goals, transitional justice mechanisms comprise of more 
than just the traditional trial before court. Transitional justice can comprise of one or 
many of the following: truth commissions; reparations; vetting; memorials and 
museums (the historicisation of the difficult past); historical projects and literature and 
trials. This thesis will concentrate on the use of tribunals, truth commissions and 
historicising the past. Descriptions of all the methods are given below:  
Truth Commissions 
Truth commissions seek to document and preserve the evidence of wrongdoings in 
the past, in this example the actions of the Khmer Rouge. They seek to provide a 
fuller picture of the past and to establish exactly who played what role in the violent 
society, rather than just focusing on the main leaders of the atrocities. The aim of a 
truth commission is not to collect evidence for potential trials, but to rather create an 
atmosphere of transparency and truth that helps the healing process.  Laura McGrew 
argues that a truth commission is very unlikely to take place in Cambodia because 
too many people currently in power fear it would implicate them in the Khmer Rouge 
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atrocities.69 She states although Cambodians state their biggest wish is to know the 
'truth' about the Khmer Rouge years, they have been surprisingly unsupportive of the 
idea of a truth commission when surveyed.70 For a truth commission in Cambodia to 
be successful, there would have to be a lot of public education to increase public 
support. However, the extent to which a truth commission would further the goal of 
creating stability and peace in Cambodia is questionable.  
Reparations 
Patrick Pearce defines reparations as a mechanism that "provides compensation to 
victims of human rights abuses, usually in the form of money, but also as material, 
medical or educational benefits... Reparations are intended to repair the past 
damage to improve a victim's or survivor’s lot in a material way".71 Reparations pose 
a practical problem in Cambodia, in that there were approximately 1.7 million victims 
of the Khmer Rouge rule, and the Cambodian government can definitely not afford to 
pay out reparations to the families of all 1.7 million victims. The second problem is 
with the definition of 'victim'. Does 'victim' only mean those that died under Khmer 
Rouge rule, or does it include those mentally or physically affected? 
Vetting 
Vetting as a method of transitional justice involves removing people from positions of 
power and responsibility to ensure that the government and security services are 
capable of providing a stable and peaceful environment. 
Historicising the Past 
Historicising the past through literature, photography, museum exhibitions, art or 
another medium provides a clear break between 'then', when the atrocities were 
carried out, and 'now', i.e. peacetime.  
Trials 
In addition to the other methods of justice, the traditional criminal trial occupies an 
important place in any transitional justice attempt. Trials can provide victims with 
closure and a certain element of revenge. Trials must be carried out sensitively to 
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avoid breaking the fragile peace in countries where public and political support is 
split.  
 
What is democracy? 
The questions 'What is democracy?' and 'How can democracy be measured?' are 
central to the discussion about how successful transitional justice has been in 
Cambodia.  
 
The Collins English Dictionary defines democracy according to the following five 
principles: 
 "1. government by the people or their elected representatives; 
 2. a political or social unit governed ultimately by all its members; 
 3. the practice or spirit of social equality; 
 4. a social condition of classlessness and equality; 
 5. the common people, esp. as a political force".72 
This definition highlights the fact that the government in a democracy must be 
elected by the all people (through universal suffrage and the election of 
representatives). It also highlights that all citizens, at least legally, should be equal.  
 
The dictionary definition of democracy is not dissimilar to some of the definitions 
offered by political scientists. David Beetham defines democracy by looking at the 
'core ideas or principles embodied in the historical conception of democracy as "rule 
of the people" ', and comes to the conclusion that "popular control" and "political 
equity" are the core ideas connected with democracy.73 The phrase 'popular control' 
suggests that the population has the ability to choose the government (through 
elections), and 'political equity' suggests that all citizens are equal and each citizen 
has one vote, and one vote only. Sartori suggests that popular participation (both 
through voting and running for office) and equality are important, but majority rule, 
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freedom, consensus, competition, pluralism and constitutional rule are equally 
important.74 
 
It is therefore evident that even within the field of political science, there is no single, 
universally accepted definition of democracy. This thesis will therefore combine the 
definitions offered above. The definition of democracy used in this thesis will include: 
the ability of all adult citizens to participate in elections to choose their government 
(universal suffrage); the ability for every voter to run for public office; the formation of 
government based on majority rule; the ability for all citizens to live freely (within the 
law) and the fair use of constitutional rule.  
 
The definition of democracy as stated above overlaps with the concepts of human 
rights and freedom, concepts key to transitional justice. One index used to measure 
freedom, democracy and human rights, Freedom House, states that its definition of 
freedom is heavily influenced by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948).75 
Its entire text will not be quoted here, but the Declaration allows for the freedom of 
expression, religion and assembly, the freedom from torture and the right to 
education and participation in the government.76 Therefore the term democracy is not 
just a form of government, but also a concept tied up with freedom and human rights. 
Therefore, all of these issues will be taken into consideration when discussing how 
successful transitional justice has been in Cambodia.  
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Transitional Justice: A Theoretical and Methodological 
Framework  
Transitional Justice as an extension of Democratic Peace Theory  
Transitional justice is inspired by Democratic Peace Theory, which holds that 
democratic states are less likely to go to war and commit genocide than autocratic 
states. Immanuel Kant first brought this idea in his 1795 work Perpetual Peace. 
Although Kant favoured constitutional republics rather than democracies, he held that 
citizens would not vote to go to war unless in self-defence.  
 
Democratic Peace Theory gained popularity in the 1970s, when a number of 
academics undertook empirical studies to try and prove that democratic states were 
less likely to go to war with other democracies than with autocratic states. Jack S. 
Levy argues, "absence of war between democracies comes as close as anything we 
have to an empirical law in international relations.”77 Michael Doyle explains this by 
arguing that democracies have to face their electorate when deciding to go to war, 
and so conflicts between democracies are likely to be solved by discussion rather 
than war.78 Although traditional Democratic Peace Theory focuses only on inter-state 
relations, some proponents have argued that democracies are less likely to suffer 
from intrastate tension and genocide than other forms of government. Harff 
concludes that genocide and politicide are rare in democracies, and Rummel 
contends that the more democratic the state, the less likely it is to commit 
democide.79 
 
Democratic Peace Theory became popular in the 1970s but it was Francis 
Fukuyama's 1989 article The End of History? (and follow up book The End of History 
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and the Last Man) that brought it back to the fore at the end of the Cold War. In the 
following excerpt, Francis Fukuyama summarises how many intellectuals and 
(Western) statesmen viewed events of 1989: 
 "What we may be witnessing in not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing 
 of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, 
 the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of 
 Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government."80 
At the time of writing this, the Berlin Wall had not yet fallen and Gorbachev still ruled 
the Soviet Union. However, a clear sense that the West had 'won' and its way of 
government (the liberal democracy) had been declared as "the final form of human 
government".81 Although he did not directly argue that democracies are less likely to 
go to war with each other, he did express hope that the spread of liberal democracy 
and therefore the declining importance of ideology would lead to a more peaceful 
world.  
 
Democratic Peace Theory has formed the basis of US foreign policy since the end of 
the Cold War. National Security Adviser Anthony Lake remarked that America's post 
Cold War policy should be to expand democracy, peace and economic prosperity 
worldwide because, "democracy and market economics hold sway in other nations, 
our own nation will be more secure, prosperous and influential."82 This follows the 
Democratic Peace premise that non-democratic states are 'troublemakers' and 
should therefore be democratised to avoid conflict. Military interventions in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have been explained by the United States, as well as more covert 
attempts to spread democracy, have been justified with democratic peace logic.  
 
Democratic Peace Theory has been criticised heavily for a variety of reasons, 
including the fact does not account for the link between rising gross national product 
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and peace.83 However, Fukuyama's revival and application of the theory to the post 
Cold War world, as well as the presence of the theory's rhetoric in United States and 
UN policy shows that it formed the basis of Western policy towards transitional states 
during the 1990s. Therefore, the theory has to be considered when analysing the 
sudden change in US (and UN) policy towards Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge after 
the fall of the Cold War.  
How can the success (or failure) of transitional justice be measured? 
The first question that arises when trying to measure the success or failure of 
transitional justice is what constitutes success in the Cambodian situation. To 
measure the success of transitional justice, the six aims of transitional justice 
(reconciliation, peace, justice, truth, forgiveness, healing - discussed in the last 
chapter) must be considered. Ultimately, success for transitional justice means that 
the transitional society is united, the crimes of the past have been at least forgiven, if 
not forgotten, and the truth is known. There should be no continuing rifts between the 
victims and the perpetrators from the old conflict.  
 
As it is impossible to objectively measure the extent to which the 'truth' is known, or 
whether reconciliation has been achieved, this thesis will analyse the extent to which 
the Cambodian people feel these goals have been achieved. To do this, two surveys 
of Cambodian victims undertaken by the Behandlungszentrum für Folteropfer Berlin 
(BZFO - Treatment Centre for Torture Victims in Berlin) undertaken in 2008/9 and 
2010 will be used.84 The merits of these surveys will be discussed in a later chapter. 
 
However, the results of these surveys do not consider whether or not the ex-Khmer 
Rouge soldiers (still in the majority in some areas of the country) feel that they have 
been forgiven by society as a whole, nor whether they are ready to reconcile. 
Existing surveys on the subject of transitional justice or the genocide tribunal in 
Cambodia are very victim centred and exclude the perpetrators. This shortcoming is 
                                            
83 For a thorough criticism based on historical events see: Layne, Christopher, 'Kant 
or Cant : The Myth of Democratic Peace', International Security, Vol 19. No.2 (1994), 
pp5-49.  
84 Behandlungszentrum für Folteropfer Berlin, The Survivors' Voices: Attitudes on the 
ECCC, the Former Khmer Rouge and Experiences with Civil Party Participation 
(December 2010).  
  27 
recognised but, due to practical constraints, cannot be rectified in order to provide a 
more balanced analysis in this thesis.85 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, transitional justice aims to support the 
transition from violence to democracy, providing justice for the victims of violence 
without derailing the transition to peace, freedom, democracy and human rights. As 
transitional justice does not just aim to gain convictions in a court setting, any 
analysis of its effectiveness has to look at more than just its success rate in court. To 
this end, this thesis will use data from three main data sets to support analysis of the 
extent to which Cambodia has been able to move from genocide, through the 
Vietnamese controlled communist regime of the 1980s to the present democratic 
state it is now. The following three data sets will enable an analysis of the extent to 
which the Cambodian state respects the human and political rights of its citizens, as 
well as enabling the reader to chart Cambodia's progress from 1976 to the present 
day: 
Polity IV 
'Polity' is a weighted score that is derived from evaluations on the competitiveness 
and regulation of political participation, as well as the openness and competiveness 
of executive (civil service) recruitment and constraints on the executive. The scale 
runs from -10 (very autocratic) to 10 (full democracy).86 
Freedom House Scale 
The Freedom House Scale has two measurements: political rights and civil liberties. 
According to Freedom House, political rights include the right to vote, the right to 
compete for public office and the right to elect representatives.87 Civil liberties include 
the freedom of speech and expression, organisational rights (for example, the right to 
form trade unions), the rule of law and personal autonomy. Countries are rated on a 
scale of 1 (free) to 7 (not free). An overall assessment of whether a country is free or 
not free is also given.  
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Political Terror Scale 
The Political Terror Scale uses the same data (from the US State Department and 
Amnesty International) as the CIRI PHYSINT scale, but measures the extent to which 
human rights violations (wrongful imprisonment and torture) have spread in the 
country. The scale ranges from one to five, and each level is described at length: 
level one means the country is under secure rule of law and murders and human 
rights abuses are rare; two means there is a limited amount of imprisonment for non-
violent political activity but torture or murder is rare; three means there is extensive 
political imprisonment and executions and torture based on political opinion are 
common; four means that human rights abuses have expanded to affect a large 
proportion of the population and murder and torture are a normal part of every day 
life; lastly, five means the human rights abuses have spread throughout the entire 
country and the leaders of these countries will stop at nothing to achieve their 
ideological goals.88 
 
These three data sets will be analysed and used to determine whether democracy, 
respect for human rights and political freedom have improved since the 
implementation of a transitional regime in 1991. However, these data sets will be 
used as guidelines, rather than a definitive judgement on the standard of Cambodia's 
democracy. The reason for this is that all of these data sets are not without their 
drawbacks. The Freedom House index in particular has been criticised for containing 
Cold War and free market biases, thus placing the United States higher than 
countries with stronger welfare systems, such as Sweden.89  
 
The data sets have also been criticised for their under or over specification, i.e. the 
requirements a country has to fulfil to be considered democratic.90 For example, 
while Freedom House uses 'socioeconomic rights', 'freedom from gross 
socioeconomic inequalities' and 'property rights' as indicators of democracy, Polity IV 
                                            
88 Information from the Political Terror Scale website, accessed at 
http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/about.php on 5 May 2011.  
89 Bollen,Kenneth, 'Political Rights and Political Liberties in Nations : An Evaluation of 
Human Rights Measures 1950-1984', Human Rights Quarterly, Vol 8, No. 4 (1986), 
p585-86 
90 Munck and Verkulien, Measuring Democracy: Evaluating Alternative Indices, paper 
prepared for delivery at the 2000 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association (2000), p23.  
  29 
does not.91 The differences between the indices stems from the fact there is no 
universally accepted definition of democracy, and therefore each index takes 
different factors into consideration. For this reason, three indices (Freedom House, 
Polity IV and the Political Terror Scale) have been taken into consideration and will 
be used as guidelines, rather than definitive judgements on Cambodia's democracy.  
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Transitional Justice in Action  
 
"Reconciliation means healing and closure. Tell the whole story—let it become a 
uniting force for Cambodians. But if you push it all onto one side or one party—that 
doesn’t work. Do the tribunal. But let the people speak the whole truth. Open the 
discourse. Don’t be square and single-minded about the law. The civil war parties 
should come together and do something. A peace museum, a joint reconstruction, 
write the history book together. Relive the horror, condemn the atrocities but [you] 
also need side-activities."92 
 
This statement by Johan Galtung, the Norwegian founder of the discipline peace and 
conflict studies, highlights the need for a multi-faceted approach to transitional justice 
in Cambodia. In the three decades between 1979 and the present day, the various 
governments in Cambodia and other international bodies such as the UN have used 
a number of different transitional justice mechanisms to help the Cambodian people 
deal with the past atrocities. These initiatives will be described below.  
Trials 
While traditional tribunals are only one of the possible mechanisms on offer by 
transitional justice, rather than the be-all and end-all in traditional justice situations, 
they still have a role to play. Since 1979, there have been two major attempts to bring 
the Khmer Rouge to justice via the court system: the People's Revolutionary Tribunal 
of 1979 and the Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia from 2005 
onwards.  
The People's Revolutionary Tribunal 
The People's Revolutionary Tribunal took place in Phnom Penh in 1979. Pol Pot and 
Ieng Sary were tried in absentia, and convicted of genocide. The trial was conducted 
without international support, as the Vietnamese backed government of Cambodia, 
the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), was not recognised outside of the 
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communist world. The trial was dismissed as a "show trial", attempted to justify 
Vietnam's military intervention in Cambodia.93  
 
However, the presiding judge and government official, Keo Chanda, argued that the 
purpose of the trial was to try "the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique for the crime of genocide 
will on the one hand expose all the criminal acts that they have committed and 
mobilize the Kampuchean people more actively to defend and build up the people's 
power, and on the other hand show the peoples of the whole world the true face of 
the criminals who are posing as the representatives of the people of Kampuchea".94  
 
The trial attempted to place itself within a United Nations (read: Western) legal 
framework by invoking the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide as its legal basis. Article 8 of the law that established the Tribunal 
stated that the Tribunal was, "in accordance with the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide", and seeks to prosecute the "criminal acts 
of the Pol Pot - Ieng Sary clique committed prior to its signing".95 In the preamble of 
the same document, attention is drawn to the fact that the Declaration of the National 
Unified Front for the Salvation of Kampuchea (i.e. Vietnamese troops and the PRK) 
on December 2. 1978 promised to 'sternly punish' all "revolutionary ringleaders, who 
stubbornly oppose the people", but also to the fact that "genocide is also defined in 
international law".96 This clearly highlights the need for a trial to gain support for the 
new government from the Cambodian people (by promising to sternly punish 
'revolutionary ringleaders') on the one hand, and on the other hand from the 
international community by placing emphasis on the PRK's willingness to use 
international law.  
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Pol Pot and Ieng Sary were found guilty of genocide and were sentenced to death 
and the government was required to confiscate their property. These sentences were 
never realised because the People's Republic of Kampuchea never managed to 
capture the two Khmer Rouge leaders, who were in hiding in the Thai jungle. Pol Pot 
died of a heart attack in his sleep in 1998 while under house arrest after hearing 
rumours that the Khmer Rouge leadership were willing to turn him over to an 
international tribunal; it has been suggested he committed suicide or was poisoned 
but these claims cannot be verified.97 In 1996, Ieng Sary was given a royal pardon for 
charges made by the People's Revolutionary Tribunal. He is currently facing trial for 
crimes against humanity, among other charges, in Cambodia. The current tribunal, 
the Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia, as well as Ieng Sary's royal 
pardon and subsequent retrial, will be discussed later.  
The Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts in Cambodia (ECCC) 
On 21 June 1997, the Cambodian government issued a request to the UN for help to 
set up a tribunal to try the Khmer Rouge for crimes against humanity.98 In December 
1997, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution asking the Secretary General to 
consider the Cambodian request.99 This resolution recommended that the Secretary 
General appoint a team of experts to analyse the legal standpoint and evidence for 
such a trial. This group of experts first visited Cambodia in November 1998, after the 
death of Pol Pot in April 1998. On 9 December 1998, the General Assembly passed 
another resolution, praising this appointment of experts and expressing hope that 
further measures will be introduced, aimed at "bringing about national unity, 
strengthening democracy and addressing the issue of individual accountability".100 
On 25 December 1998, two high ranking Khmer Rouge leaders, Khieu Samphan and 
Nuon Chea, surrendered. By the end of 1998, therefore, the attempts to gain justice 
in Cambodia were looking fruitful.  
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This potential could not only be seen in the United Nations, but also within Cambodia 
itself. Despite its initial reservations, the Royal Cambodian Government created its 
Khmer Rouge Task Force on 20 August 1999. This task force was to work on drafting 
a law to allow for a genocide tribunal. Australian and UN legal experts assisted the 
task group.101The Cambodian government passed a law creating the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia on 10 August 2001. This law allows for the 
prosecution of Khmer Rouge members for acts of wilful killing, inhumane torture, 
destruction of cultural property and wilful denial of fair trials, amongst other crimes.102 
This law was welcomed by the United Nations, who promised legal and financial 
support for the project.103 
 
However, on 8 February 2002, the UN withdrew from negotiations with Cambodia 
over fears that the judiciary planned by Phnom Penh "would not guarantee the 
independence, objectivity and impartiality that a court established with the support of 
the United Nations must have."104 After months of negotiation between the UN 
(General Secretary Kofi Annan took part personally) and the Royal Cambodian 
Government, a draft agreement between the United Nations and Cambodia was 
written in March 2003.105 
 
This agreement established the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic 
Kampuchea, which would be responsible for prosecuting the surviving leaders of the 
Khmer Rouge for crimes against humanity between 17 April 1975 and 7 January 
1979.106 The agreement stated that all chambers of the Extraordinary Chambers 
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would include Cambodian and international judges, with the Cambodian judges 
having the majority. In total there should be seventeen Cambodian judges and twelve 
international judges, and every decision requires a majority and the agreement of at 
least one of the international judges.  Cambodian law would be applied in all three 
chambers, as well as international law, but in case of a disagreement, international 
law would prevail. This agreement ensured that the quality of the Cambodian 
judiciary would meet UN standards, and allowed for the establishment of the 
Extraordinary Courts in January 2006.107 Therefore, the ECCC's emphasis on 
Cambodian law differentiates it from other courts responsible for prosecuting crimes 
against humanity (for example in Rwanda or the former republics of Yugoslavia), 
which follow purely international law.  
Problems for the Prosecution 
Since, and even before, the ECCC's inception in 2006, the International-Cambodian 
hybrid courts have encountered problems and obstacles that could make it difficult to 
secure convictions.  
Evidence 
The first problem is a problem of evidence. The Khmer Rouge left a great deal of 
evidence behind them when they were overthrown in January 1979, including: mass 
graves; meticulous photographic and documentary evidence of victims and their fate 
and annotations on documents by party officials. These documents have been kept 
in a usable condition by the Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam), whose 
role will be discussed later on in this chapter.108 
 
However, the ECCC works within the Cambodian legal system, which is in turn 
based on the French system and varies significantly from the Anglo-Saxon legal 
system most international prosecutors, are familiar with.109 Unlike the Anglo-Saxon 
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legal system, which imposes heavy restrictions on which kind of evidence is 
admissible and which isn't, the Cambodian system relies heavily on investigatory 
judges, who decide on a case for case basis what evidence they want to use. 110 
These investigatory judges play a bigger role in prosecution than in the jury heavy 
Anglo-Saxon legal tradition, as they ultimately decide if there is enough evidence for 
them to pass the case onto a prosecuting judge. If the investigating judge is not sure 
that the case will result in a conviction, he or she is unlikely to pass the case on.111 
Therefore, it is of utmost importance that the individuals on trial can be found guilty 
on the basis of the documentary evidence, rather than relying on a sympathetic jury.  
 
The second major evidence based problem stems from the fact the ECCC was first 
initiated three decades after the fall of the Khmer Rouge regime. DC-Cam was first 
founded in 2005, which still leaves sixteen years in between the fall of the Khmer 
Rouge and the reliable conservation of the documents by DC-Cam. It is therefore 
possible that the defence could argue the documents are unreliable, due to the fact 
they have passed through the hands of numerous governments and could therefore 
have been tampered with or falsified.  
 
The problem of unreliable evidence has been raised a number of times by the 
defence teams for the five major suspects, most notably regarding the use of 
Vietnamese video footage in the trial against Kaing Guek Eav (aka Duch). The video 
footage, allegedly filmed by the Vietnamese as they liberated prison S-21 (which 
Duch controlled), shows images of decapitated corpses, torture instruments and 
scenes of Vietnamese soldiers saving two infants and two children from the central 
compound. The trial chamber of the ECCC denied the inclusion of this footage in the 
case on grounds that the reliability of the footage is disputed and it is unlikely that 
authenticity verification could be obtained within reasonable time.112 
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However, despite isolated problems with evidence (especially evidence obtained 
from the Vietnamese government), the ECCC prosecutors have been able to use a 
large database of verified evidence made available by DC-Cam.  
Witnesses 
Just as the documentary evidence could have been changed throughout the course 
of the last three decades, the reliability of the memories and statements from 
witnesses could be called into question. In 2004, Tom Fawthorp and Helen Jarvis 
wrote about the possibility of including witness statements from the People's 
Revolutionary Tribunal (PRT) of 1979 in the ECCC procedures.113 In order to do this, 
the prosecutors would have to prove that the PRT team did not ask leading questions 
to provoke incriminating responses from witnesses. As discussed earlier, the PRK 
had a vested interest in the success of the PRT, as the conviction of Khmer Rouge 
leaders showed the Vietnamese invasion was out of legitimate concern for the 
Cambodian people, rather than the cynical imperialism it was painted as by the 
Western media.  
Who should be prosecuted? 
Another question central to transitional justice is who should be prosecuted. In cases 
like Cambodia, where many citizens were somehow involved (either knowingly or 
unwittingly, either voluntarily or forced) in the mass killing of their fellow citizens, it 
would be both technically impossible and politically and socially unwise to prosecute 
every person who had a role in the killings. Thus the question arises, how should 
transitional justice decide who should be prosecuted for the crimes? 
 
The Khmer Rouge Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers (ECCC 
Law) states that: 
 "The purpose of this law is to bring to trial senior leaders of Democratic 
 Kampuchea and those who were most responsible for the serious crimes and 
 violations of Cambodian penal law, international humanitarian law and custom, 
 and international conventions recognised by Cambodia, that were committed 
 during the period from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979".114 
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Therefore, it is clear that only senior Khmer Rouge leaders can be prosecuted and 
not any foreign countries or members of the Vietnamese sponsored People's 
Republic of Kampuchea that ruled Cambodia after the fall of the Khmer Rouge. 
 
 The problem for the prosecution is who can be considered a 'senior' member of the 
Khmer Rouge. The ECCC Law, the Cambodian government or the United Nations 
offers no further definition of the phrase ‘senior leader’. However, Prime Minister Hun 
Sen has made it clear that he will not allow any more cases after Case 002, stating it 
would put peace in Cambodia at risk.115 At present, only two cases have been 
presented to the ECCC: Case 001 (Kaing Guek Eav aka Duch) for crimes connected 
with S-21 Security Prison in Phnom Penh and Case 002 (Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith, 
Nuon Chia and Khieu Samphan) for more widespread crimes during the Khmer 
Rouge era. Cases 003 and 004 are currently being prepared, but the names of the 
defendants and the crimes supposedly committed are closely guarded secrets. It 
remains to be seen if these cases will be allowed to commence.  
What can be prosecuted?  
In the ECCC Law of 2004, a number of different international and Cambodian 
treaties, laws and codes were named as possibilities for the ECCC prosecution team. 
These options will be discussed below.  
Genocide as defined by the Genocide Convention (1948) 
In criminal proceedings, transitional justice uses both national and international law to 
bring the perpetrators of crimes against humanity to justice. Here, one main 
international convention, the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, comes into play. The United Nations 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) 
defines genocide as: 
 " ...any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in 
 part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: 
 (a) Killing members of the group; 
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 (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
 (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring 
 about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
 (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
 (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.116 
Cambodia has been party to the United Nations Genocide Convention since 14 
October 1950.117  
 
It is important to note that the Genocide Convention defines genocide as the 
removal, or attempted removal, of ethnic, national, racial or religious, but significantly 
not political, group. The stated aims of the Khmer Rouge were to remove obstacles 
to the revolution. This aim has led to many commentators to argue that, although the 
killings were tragic and numerous, they do not constitute genocide because a political 
group was targeted.  
 
In a 1989 article for Human Rights Quarterly, Hurst Hannum argued that the killings 
in Cambodia did constitute genocide because the Khmer Rouge did not just target 
political groups, but national, ethnic, religious and racial groups as well.118 He states 
that the Khmer Rouge targeted the Cham ("a non-Khmer people of Malayo-
Polynesian stock"), and these killings can be seen as an attempt to destroy the Cham 
ethnic group in Cambodia.119 He states that the Khmer Rouge started a policy of 
Khmerisation in areas of Cambodia under their control as early as 1973. This policy 
included forcibly removing Cham children and placing them under the care of Khmer 
families. The forcible transfer of children of one ethnic group into another ethnic 
group is considered genocide under the terms of the Genocide Convention.120 In 
1975, the Khmer Rouge leadership stated, "from now on the various nationalities do 
not exist any longer in Kampuchea".121 The Cham people were subjected to torture, 
execution and inhumane living conditions. From a pre-1970 population estimate of 
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700,000, only approximately 200,000 Cham survived the Khmer Rouge era.122 These 
deaths can be seen as evidence of Khmer Rouge genocide against an ethnic group.  
 
Hannum also provides evidence of genocide against religious groups, predominately 
but not exclusively, Buddhists. The Democratic Kampuchean Constitution provided 
the right to worship according to any religion but prohibited "all reactionary religions 
that are detrimental to Democratic Kampuchea and the Kampuchean people".123 
Therefore, the right to worship was de jure secured under the Khmer Rouge; de 
facto, however, all religions were viewed as "reactionary" and prohibited and 
Buddhism was subjected to "eradication in less than twelve months".124 Religious 
practices were forbidden, temples were used as warehouses or execution facilities, 
Buddha images and religious artefacts were destroyed and a large number of monks 
were executed. In 1975 there were approximately 60,000 monks in Cambodia; in 
late-1979 there were just 1,000.125 In 1978, the Minister of Culture and Education 
Yun Yat stated that Buddhism was incompatible with the goals of the revolution and 
was "a relic of the past, forgotten and surpassed".126 This evidence leads Hannum to 
argue that the destruction of the Buddhist monkhood is "precisely the kind of act the 
Genocide Convention was formulated to proscribe and prevent".127 
 
Lastly, the Khmer as a national group were also victims of genocide. The Genocide 
Convention does not state that a member of a national group killing other members 
of the same national group is not genocide. Large numbers of Khmer people were 
killed between 1975-79, some because of their political leanings or social status. For 
example, army officers and civil servants from the previous regime were among the 
first to be targeted by the Khmer Rouge.128 However, many more working class 
Khmer people without connections to the previous regime were killed by the Khmer 
Rouge because they were "worthless ones" and seen as obstacles to the purification 
of the Khmer race.129  
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Therefore, there is significant evidence to show that the common presumption that 
the Khmer Rouge killings were purely political is false and that the Khmer Rouge did 
in fact commit genocide against national, religious and ethnic groups within 
Cambodia between 1975 and 1979.  
 
The United States government has also lent credibility to the view that the Khmer 
Rouge did actually commit genocide.  The 1994 Cambodian Genocide Justice Act 
states, "The persecution of the Cambodian people under the Khmer Rouge rule, 
[when] the bulk of the Khmer people were subjected to life in an Asian Auschwitz, 
constituted one of the clearest acts of genocide in recent history".130 The Genocide 
Convention is also listed in the 2004 Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary 
Chambers (article 4), as a potential law the ECCC could invoke against the 
suspects.131 
Is Cambodia obliged to prosecute? 
The Khmer Rouge crimes in Cambodia violated the Genocide Convention, to which 
Cambodia was party. Thus the question arises, is Cambodia (or any other state in 
this situation) obliged to prosecute the remaining Khmer Rouge ringleaders under the 
Genocide Convention, even if doing so would risk the tentative peace? 
 
Article IV of the Genocide Convention states: 
 "Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in  
 Article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the  
 territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal  
 tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting  
 Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction. "132 
 
This places the responsibility of prosecuting the Khmer Rouge firmly with a 
"competent tribunal of the State", i.e. the Cambodian Courts, or another international 
alternative that Cambodia has accepted.  
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Has ne bis in idem been violated? 
Ne bis in idem is the legal principle that the same person cannot be tried for the 
same crime twice. This principle is important to the case of Ieng Sary, as he has 
already been tried for genocide on the basis of crimes committed between 1975 and 
1979.  
 
Both Cambodian and international law contain references to ne bis in idem, whereby 
international law offers clearer guidelines of when a retrial is possible and when not. 
The principle is enshrined in the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 
and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. In Article 20 of the Rome 
Statute, the retrial (in any court) of a person who has already been convicted or 
acquitted by the ICC is forbidden, except under the following circumstances: 
• The person was tried in another court purely to avoid being called before the 
ICC.  
• The original trial was not conducted independently, fairly, impartially or in 
accordance with the due process of international law, or in any other 
circumstances that were inconsistent with the aim of bringing that person to 
justice. 
Cambodian law offers no direct reference to ne bis in idem; neither does the ECCC 
Law of 2004.  
 
In 1979, the People's Revolutionary Tribunal found Pol Pot and Ieng Sary guilty in 
absentia of genocide and sentenced them to death. Even though the People's 
Revolutionary Tribunal was regarded as a 'show trial' by the West, these convictions 
carried some legal weight in Cambodia. As a result of this, King Sihanouk had to 
offer a pardon for the crime of genocide to Ieng Sary to secure his defection to the 
government in 1996.133 
 
As previously discussed, the People's Revolutionary Tribunal explicitly invoked the 
Genocide Convention (1948) as the basis of the genocide charges. Therefore, the 
ECCC encountered the problem of whether or not Ieng Sary could be tried for the 
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same crimes twice, once in 1979 and once by the ECCC. As Ieng Sary is due to face 
trial in the summer of 2011, it is obvious that the ECCC panel has decided he can be 
tried for the Khmer Rouge era crimes twice.  
 
The official ECCC answered the question 'Have any of the senior Khmer Rouge 
leaders been tried before?' with the following statement: 
 "In 1996, the King granted a pardon to Ieng Sary for the sentence imposed 
 when the People's Revolutionary Tribunal tried him for genocide. It will be up 
 to the judges to decide on the scope of this pardon. In addition, other charges 
 may be brought against him on the evidence available."134 
This statement places the responsibility for trying Ieng Sary again firmly with the 
ECCC judges, but also hints at other charges. These charges include crimes against 
humanity, the violation of the Geneva Convention and the violation of the Cambodian 
Penal Code (1956). In 2010, Ieng Sary was indicted with all of the crimes mentioned 
above with the obvious, meaningful exception of the violation of the Genocide 
Convention.135 It has not been confirmed whether this decision was taken because 
convictions under the Genocide Convention are considered unlikely (based on the 
strict criteria of the 1948 text) or because Ieng Sary has already been found guilty of 
genocide in the Khmer Rouge years. However, Ieng Sary has not been singled out 
as the only defendant not to face trial for genocide crimes under the Genocide 
Convention.   
 
Despite not being charged under the Genocide Convention, Ieng Sary claimed that 
the royal pardon conferred upon him by the King in 1996, as well as the amnesty 
offered to the Khmer Rouge under the law that outlawed the party in 1994, meant 
that he could not be tried by the ECCC. The pre trial chamber of the ECCC rejected 
these claims on 11 April 2011 on the grounds that “the 1979 trial was not conducted 
by an impartial and independent tribunal with regard to due process 
requirements".136This comment makes reference to the Rome Statute, which states 
that if the first trial is not impartial or independent, a second trial does not violate the 
                                            
134 ECCC FAQs, accessed on 21 May 2011 at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/faq/have-
any-khmer-rouge-senior-leaders-been-tried .  
135 ECCC information on the indictment of Ieng Sary, accessed on 21 May 2011 at 
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/indicted-person/ieng-sary  
136 ECCC Pre Trial Chamber, Decision on Ieng Sary's Appeal, 11 April 2011 
  43 
ne bis in idem principle. The decision also takes into account Ieng Sary was tried in 
absentia in 1979, which contravenes article 14 of the 1966 International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights ("to be tried in their own presence and to defend themselves 
in person or with the assistance of counsel of their own choosing") quoted in 2004 
ECCC Law.137 
 
The pre-trial chamber also found that the royal pardon was only a guarantee Ieng 
Sary would not be executed or have his property taken away, as was prescribed by 
the 1979 decision, and not a guarantee against any further trials. With this statement 
by the pre trial chamber, the issue has been put aside but Ieng Sary and his counsel 
could still dispute any conviction on these grounds in summer 2011 when the case 
comes before the trial chamber.  
 
1956 Cambodian Penal Code 
As the Khmer Rouge never repealed the existing 1956 Penal Code, it was technically 
in force for the full duration of the Khmer Rouge period. The Khmer Rouge Law, 
which established the ECCC, identifies the following crimes and articles of the 1956 
Cambodian Penal Code as relevant to the ECCC procedures: 
a) Homicide (found in articles 501, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507 and 508) 
b) Torture (found in article 500) 
c) Religious Persecution (articles 209 and 210). 138 
The decision to include the Cambodian Penal Code in the list of laws contravened by 
the Khmer Rouge is a conscious one, as it emphasises the Cambodian role in the 
ECCC procedure and makes it clear the ECCC is not just an international war crimes 
court prosecuting in solely accordance with international law.  
 
 Every suspect except Duch has been charged with homicide, torture, and religious 
persecution within the meaning of the Cambodian Penal Code from 1956. Judges in 
Case 001 (Duch) were not able to agree on whether charges under the Cambodian 
Penal Code were necessary on top of the international law charges, and therefore 
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Duch's objections to being charged under Cambodian law were accepted and struck 
from the charges list.139 
Crimes Against Humanity 
Crimes against humanity were first mentioned in the Nuremburg trials of 1945 and 
more recently have been used in the International Criminal Tribunals in Yugoslavia 
(1993) and Rwanda (1994). However, this charge was first explicitly enshrined in a 
convention in 1998 Statute of Rome. Crimes against humanity are defined in the 
Statute of Rome as: 
" any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: 
(a)     Murder;  
(b)     Extermination; 
 (c)     Enslavement;  
 (d)     Deportation or forcible transfer of population;  
 (e)     Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of 
fundamental rules of international law;  
 (f)     Torture; 
  (g)     Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced 
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity".140 
 
As one can see, in comparison with the definition of genocide per Genocide 
Convention (1948), the definition of crimes against humanity is wide and 
encompasses the Khmer Rouge crimes without question. All five accused have been 
charged with crimes against humanity, and one of the five (Duch) has already been 
found guilty of these crimes.  
Geneva Convention (1949) 
The fourth Geneva Convention was written in 1949 with the aim of giving protection 
to civilian victims of war. The ECCC Law (2004) also gives the Extraordinary 
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Chambers the power to charge suspects with grave breaches of the Geneva 
Convention. The law lists: 
"Wilful killing;   
• Torture or inhumane treatment;   
• Wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health;   
• Destruction and serious damage to property, not justified by military necessity  
And carried out unlawfully and wantonly;   
• Compelling a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the forces of a hostile   
power;   
• Wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or civilian the rights of fair and regular  
trial;   
• Unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a civilian;   
• Taking civilians as hostages." 141 
 
 Kaing Guek Eav, aka Duch, the head of S-21 prison in Phnom Penh, was also found 
guilty of grave breaches of the Geneva Convention on 26th July 2010. Nuon Chea, 
Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith and Khieu Samphan also charged with grave breaches of the 
Geneva Convention.  
The Hague Convention (1954) 
The ECCC Law also makes provision for the Hague Convention (1954) to be used to 
prosecute the destruction of cultural property during the Khmer Rouge era. Thus far, 
the ECCC has not charged any of the suspects under the Hague Convention.  
Convictions 
Since 2006, the Courts have indicted five Khmer Rouge members, Kaing Guek Eav, 
Nuon Chea, Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary and Ieng Thirith. Only Kaing Guek Eav, the 
governor of Tuol Sleng Prison in Phnom Penh (the major hub of torture activity 
between 1975-1979), has been tried and convicted of crimes against humanity and 
grave breaches of the Geneva Convention (on 26 July 2010). The other four Khmer 
Rouge members are due to face trial in the summer of 2011.  
Truth Commissions  
In 1999, the UN Group of Experts in Cambodia recognised that, “telling a  
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story beyond that concerning the defendants alone, including one that includes the 
historical context of the atrocities and the roles of many actors" could be of use in a 
transitional justice scenario.142 To date there has been no official truth telling 
commission (following the Chilean or South African example) set up by the 
Cambodian government.  
 
However, local NGOs have taken the initiative and have set up 'truth forums'. The 
Cambodian Center for Social Development (CSD) has set up a number of public 
forums in which victims and Khmer Rouge cadres come together to discuss the 
ECCC's work. These forums give normal citizens a voice. The first CSD forum was 
held in Battambang on 27th January 2000 and was attended by 120 Khmer Rouge 
members. Two further forums were held in Phnom Penh and Sihanoukville in 2000, 
and in 2006 three further forums were held in Pailin, Kampot and Kratie. Each forum 
discussed different topics and very different opinions were expressed in each of the 
forums.  
 
The forums that took place before the ECCC was set up in 2005/6, i.e. in 
Battambang, Phnom Penh and Sihanoukville, focused on the need for a trial. In 
Battambang many Democratic Kampuchea (DK, i.e. Khmer Rouge) officers argued 
against the idea of a trial, suggesting that they would cause more division and may 
violate the 1994 amnesties under the anti-DK laws.143 In the Phnom Penh forum, 
83.8% of participants agreed that the Khmer Rouge must be tried, and 56.6% argued 
the trials should encompass the years before 1975 (including the American bombing 
of Cambodia, which some say contributed to the popularity of the Khmer Rouge) and 
after 1979 (the Vietnamese years).144 
 
By 2006 the ECCC had been established and the discussion at the forums turned to 
the education of the Cambodian public. It was argued that the Cambodian public as a 
whole knew too little about the ECCC process, what actually happened under the 
Khmer Rouge and the role of China, Russia, Vietnam and the United States in the 
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atrocities.145 In Pailin some participants raised the question of whether or not 
members of the current government would be tried for their participation in the Khmer 
Rouge genocide.146 
A Comparison with Chile 
In contrast to the Cambodian government, the Chilean government (under President 
Patricio Alywin) have shown full support for the two truth commissions investigating 
murders and disappearances under the rule of General Pinochet. The first truth 
commission, The National Commission of Truth and Reconciliation, was established 
within months of the end of Pinochet's reign in March 1990 and published its full 
report, known as the Rettig Report, in February 1991. This report claimed that 2,279 
people had been killed by the Pinochet government for political reasons.147 The first 
part of the follow up National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture (the 
Valech Report) was published in November 2004. The second part of the Valech 
report has been classified as secret and will therefore not be published until 2054 
and cannot be used as evidence in any trials. 
 
Unlike the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, Pinochet was still militarily and politically 
present in Chilean political life at the time of the truth commission and afterwards. 
Until 1998, Pinochet remained Commander in Chief of the Armed Services and also 
held 'senator for life' status and was immune to prosecution under the 1978 amnesty 
law passed by the junta.148 Facing these obstacles to prosecution, it is easy to see 
why the newly elected Chilean government decided upon a truth commission with 
amnesties rather than attempting to bring Pinochet to trial in 1990.  
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However, the situation in Cambodia different and as such makes it harder to justify 
offering amnesties for truth tellers in a truth commission. Firstly, the crimes in 
question took place over thirty years ago and most of the perpetrators (except for the 
senior leaders) have been successfully reintegrated into society and those around 
them do not know their identity as executioners or prison wardens. In most cases, 
these low level Khmer Rouge were forced to commit these crimes through fear for 
their own life. An example of this can be seen in this story related by an NGO worker 
in Cambodia: 
 "'I had a young Cambodian who worked with me. He told me he was living 
 near the Thai border and his family was starving. The families were living in 
 extreme poverty. One couldn't go out while the other did because they wore 
 the same clothes. When he was 9 years old he was recruited as a soldier. The 
 Khmer Rouge took these kids, told them they would give them food. These 
 kids were then brainwashed. They were the real killers. They taught them to 
 kill with sticks -- forced them to do this."149 
 
In addition to this, many Khmer Rouge cadres defected to the government in 1994 
when the government outlawed the Khmer Rouge and offered those who came over 
to the government amnesty and government posts.150 This could explain the 
government's reluctance to start a truth commission, if large numbers of civil servants 
would be implicated. Therefore, in Chile the truth commission was started within 
months of the end of the Pinochet regime, before the perpetrators had had a chance 
to reintegrate into Chilean society. In Cambodia, the fact that the abuses were 
widespread, undertaken by ordinary adults and children under duress and the fact 
that most of the Khmer Rouge leaders and cadres have surrendered and defected to 
the government means that a government sponsored truth commission is very 
unlikely to take place. Even if it was to take place, the benefit of exposing 
perpetrators that have now reintegrated themselves is questionable.  
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Historicising the Past: Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum and Choueng Ek 
(aka 'The Killing Fields') 
Where is the past remembered? 
The site the Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum now occupies was a high school that was 
transformed into Cambodia's most notorious torture and execution camp (known as 
S-21) under the Khmer Rouge in 1975. It is estimated that over 14,000 people were 
brought to S-21 between 1975-79, all of whom were photographed and tortured until 
they confessed to whatever crime they had been accused of.151 All but three 
detainees were executed, either on site or at the nearby Choueng Ek (killing fields).  
 
S-21 was opened as a genocide museum in 1980 by the new Vietnamese backed 
regime. The museum consists of four buildings, buildings A, B, C and D. Building A 
contains individual torture cells, including the torture equipment the Khmer Rouge 
used to torture confessions from their victims. On the wall of each cell, there is a 
picture of a corpse that had been tortured to death there (original Khmer Rouge 
photographs). In building B, there are 100s of mug shots of prisoners that were taken 
by the Khmer Rouge when admitting the new prisoners into S-21.  
 
Mug shots of victims on display in S-21 Genocide Museum152 
Building C contains the tiny cells and shackles were the prisoners were held. It also 
contains information boards about living conditions in S-21 Building D houses the art 
work of Vann Nath, a prisoner who escaped death by painting portraits of Pol Pot. 
These works of art depict the many different ways prisoners were tortured. Building D 
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also housed Mai Lam's famous 'Map of Cambodia', a map of Cambodia with many 
skulls and bones and rivers painted blood red. This map was removed in the early 
2000s because it was considered too graphic.153 The entire museum makes a big 
impact on the visitor. Firstly the bare cells and photographs in buildings A and B have 
a sobering effect, and the quantity of information and graphic images in buildings C 
and D are designed to shock and provoke reactions.  
 
Choueng Ek is one of more than 500 killing fields uncovered so far in Cambodia. It is 
located about 10km from Phnom Penh and was opened as a genocide memorial 
museum by the Vietnamese in 1980. There are dozens of minimally labelled mass 
graves containing items of clothing or human bones. The visitor is free to decide how 
they would like to view these, as there are no official guides and no signposts 
suggesting a route.  Many trees are dotted around the killing field, and some have 
been labelled to reveal their function, for example 'Chankiri tree against which 
executioners beat children'. In the middle of the site is a 30m high pagoda with glass 
walls, filled with over 8,000 human skulls. This pagoda was built in 1988 and the 
visitor can enter the pagoda and walk around inside, so the skulls can be viewed 
from inside and outside.  
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Pagoda at Choueng Ek from the outside154 Pagoda from the inside.. The skulls of victims are clearly visible155 
The site also has a small hut where films about the killing fields are shown in Khmer, 
English and French.  
Why are these crimes remembered? 
In January 2008, Louis Bickford from the Memory, Memorials and Museums Program 
(MMMP) at the International Center of Transitional Justice interviewed Choueng Ek 
visitors about their motivations for visiting, and responses to, the Choueng Ek site.156 
In the survey, the two most popular answers to the question 'What do you believe the 
purpose of this memorial site is?' were 'to educate Cambodian and international 
visitors' and 'preserving memory'.157 
 
However, as Louis Bickford notes, the site remains largely unchanged from its 1980s 
state.158 Opened by the People's Republic of Kampuchea, the memorial site had a 
hidden message of 'support the government or the Khmer Rouge might come back', 
to the Cambodian people. Bickford argues that this helps account for the sometimes-
horrific descriptions of the execution methods used, and the constant condemnation 
of the Khmer Rouge throughout the site.159 The Khmer Rouge is referred to as a 
"genocidal clique" both in Choueng Ek and S-21, using similar language to that used 
in the 1979 People's Revolutionary Tribunal and the PRK era. Apart from emotive 
language, very little is said about the Khmer Rouge, its leaders or its ideology at 
either of the sites.  
 
The question of why the sites have not been updated since the PRK times (1979-
1991) remains open and has not been answered by the Cambodian government or 
DC-Cam.  
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Who is remembered? 
In S-21 and Choueng Ek the main focus is on the crimes committed, rather than the 
victims. Both sites offer very little biographical information on the victims. Even in S-
21, where mug shots of all prisoners are on display, the names of the victims and 
perhaps the age is the only information the visitor is privy to. Some respondents to 
the Bickford survey commented that they would like more information about the 
victims, like in other Holocaust and genocide museums.160 Some common 
suggestions to improve the Choueng Ek site focused on the victims, including: 
• Mounting photos or paintings of the victims near the mass graves 
• Showing or telling stories about the victims 
• Posting information about daily life under Pol Pot 
• Displaying more artefacts from the victims, except for the scraps of clothing 
that litter the site.161 
These changes had not been made in August 2010.  
Who remembers? 
Until the end of the Cold War, S-21 was mostly visited by local people searching for 
information about their relatives, or by foreigners from the Soviet bloc. Since 1993 
and the establishment of the Kingdom of Cambodia, the visitors have mainly been 
from Taiwan, Germany, the US, Japan, Germany and France.162 The entrance fees 
for both sites are waived for Cambodians, and are kept at $2 for international visitors 
(August 2010).  
What is remembered? 
Unlike present day Holocaust museums, especially the United States Holocaust 
Museum in Washington DC, the two Cambodian genocide museums focus more on 
the methods of torture and death itself, rather than the victims. In the Holocaust 
memorials it also took a long time for the focus to shift from the methods to the 
victims. In his study of Yad Vashem in Israel, the United States Holocaust Museum in 
Washington DC and Topographie des Terrors in Berlin, Matthias Hass describes the 
differences between the three Holocaust memorial centres and examines the 
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differences in focus.163 He argues that in Berlin the focus was on telling a history of 
the organisations operating under the Nazi regime, and any information about the 
perpetrators or the victims is kept short and relevant to the history of the institutions 
and buildings.164 He states that in the United States, the Holocaust is remembered 
through a lens of American values and 'never again' principles, and in Israel, the 
history of the Holocaust is presented within a wider history of European, and later 
Israeli, Jews.165 He suggests that each memorial site in Germany has a different 
function, for example Topographie des Terrors is responsible for telling the 
institutional history, whereas Gedenkstätte Sachsenhausen tells the history of 
concentration camps and the Holocaust memorial statue in Berlin concentrates on 
the Jewish victims.166 However, the memorial statue in Berlin was only opened in 
2005, and this shows the time lag between the event itself and the remembrance of 
the victims rather than just focusing on the perpetrators and institutions. The same 
could be true of Cambodia.  
 
Paul Williams suggests that by providing each visitor with a picture and a biography 
of a Holocaust victim, the US Holocaust Museum seeks to engage the visitor with the 
victim and provoke empathy.167 He suggests because it is unlikely that international 
visitors will visit the two Cambodian sites as a personal tribute to lost relatives (in the 
way the perhaps might in Europe or the US), the Cambodian sites had to be made so 
they could be experienced as "theaters of gruelling historical spectacle rather than 
sanctuaries for private tribute".168 
 
The Bickford team interviewed a number of different people from different countries, 
including 14 Australians, 7 Cambodians, 7 New Zealanders, 6 Americans, and 4 
Spaniards. Most visitors agreed that the 'raw' state of the Choueng Ek site (for 
example, the lack of technology or interactive guides) makes the site more shocking 
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and more effective.169 The information on how victims were tortured and killed is 
shocking for most Western visitors, who are more used to the brief information 
regarding these subjects offered by Western Holocaust museums.  
Historicising the Past: Genocide Education 
After the Khmer Rouge regime fell in 1979, there was a significant lack of personnel 
qualified to teach genocide education to the victims in Cambodia. During the Khmer 
Rouge years, 75% of the teaching staff, 96% of tertiary education students and 67% 
of all primary and secondary school pupils were murdered or died of malnutrition or 
disease.170  Therefore, education as a whole was dealt a blow by the Khmer Rouge. 
In addition to the lack of teaching staff, education took a decidedly more political turn 
during the period between 1979 and the end of the Cold War. These changes can be 
traced in the Cambodian school history curriculum.  
School History Curriculum 
Under the PRK, the Cambodian genocide occupied a pivotal role in the school 
curriculum in Cambodia.171 Since the end of the PRK rule, the genocide and 
education about the Khmer Rouge era has been notably absent.172 The current DC-
Cam director said, “the younger generation has the right to know their own history 
and the government has the obligation to provide the whole truth. For example, in the 
history book for Grade 9 [ages sixteen and seventeen] there is only one paragraph 
about the Khmer Rouge.”173 
 
During the PRK years (1979-1989), genocide education and the Khmer Rouge both 
took centre stage in the Cambodian school curriculum. Khamboly Dy argues "In post-
genocide Cambodia, genocide education became a political tool for parties 
competing for power".174 He argues that children in PRK controlled areas were told 
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that Khmer Rouge soldiers were monsters that killed people and drank their blood, 
and children in Khmer Rouge controlled areas were told talk of a genocide was a 
myth fabricated by the Vietnamese in order to gain control. In PRK controlled areas 
even school textbooks were strongly politicised. In one year one reading book 
published in 1979, there were two sentences about the Khmer Rouge regime: 
 "Our people supplied foodstuffs to the soldiers who were sweeping up the  
 traitors Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique."175 
In addition to this, slightly older pupils (year two and three) were taught the Khmer 
Rouge killed three million people (as opposed to the 1-2 million estimations) and 
were subjected to images of Khmer Rouge soldiers disembowelling people.  
 
After the end of the civil war (1991) and the election of the new government (1993), 
the history curriculum was overhauled and new school textbooks were written and 
released. Khmer Rouge history was notably absent. Khamboly Dy argues that the 
new government omitted the Khmer Rouge era history from the textbooks "for the 
sake of national reconciliation".176 Even when the school curriculum was overhauled 
in 2000-2001, very little was written about the Khmer Rouge era. In one 9th grade 
textbook there were only five sentences about the Khmer Rouge era.177 In the 12th 
grade textbook, there were three pages devoted to the genocide, covering topics 
such as political conditions, economy and the formation of the Khmer Rouge. The 
chapter ends by echoing the PRK textbooks: "This regime had more than three 
million innocent people killed... the DK plunged the entire country into a real 
catastrophe in three years, eight months and twenty days".178 
 
In 2002, even these scanty mentions of the Khmer Rouge era were removed from 
the 12th grade social studies textbook at the order of Prime Minister Hun Sen. Dy 
Khamboly suggests this is due to a difference of opinion between Prince Norodom 
Ranariddah and Hun Sen over the portrayal of the 1993 election in the textbook.179 In 
the 2001 edition of the 12th grade book, there was no mention of the fact that 
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Ranariddah's party Funcinpec won the first national election in 1993, while the 
People's Party victory in 1998 played a central role.180 Ranariddah called for a 
revision of the textbook and the Ministry of Education responded by agreeing to the 
revision, but adding they would enlarge the Khmer Rouge history section.181 Due to 
the royal family's connections with the Khmer Rouge, this announcement is most 
likely to have angered Ranariddah and led to worry that the royal family would be 
portrayed in a bad light. Since this episode and the subsequent withdrawal of the 
textbooks, Cambodian students have been learning social studies without a textbook.  
 
DC-Cam saw the lack of genocide education in the Cambodian curriculum and 
established the Genocide Education Project in 2004. This project ran until 2007 and 
resulted in A History of Democratic Kampuchea, a book about the Khmer Rouge 
regime aimed at educating the public, authored by Khamboly Dy. This book was 
distributed to 289 secondary schools in Cambodia, and the Cambodian government 
did not hinder the distribution process. Dy himself views this event as "the first fruitful 
move towards genocide education in Cambodia".182 
Other Methods 
Reparations 
If an accused person is convicted by the ECCC, victims may ask the court to make 
an order of reparations. Under Cambodian law, civil parties may claim compensation 
in criminal cases for damages they suffered from the crimes being tried. The judges 
have decided that individual financial compensation will not be possible in the 
ECCC.183 However, the judges may award collective and moral reparations such as 
an order to publish the judgment in appropriate media outlets at the convicted 
person’s expense or an order to fund any non-profit activity or service that is intended 
for the benefit of victims.  
DC-Cam 
The Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-CAM) was established in January 
1995, initially with $500,000 USD from the Yale University Cambodian Genocide 
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Program (although the funds were given to Yale by the US government). The United 
Kingdom and Sweden have both contributed generous amounts to DC-Cam.184 
 
DC-Cam aims to research and gather information about the period between 1975-9, 
mainly for educational purposes, but also to provide evidence for a “duly constituted 
legal body" (the ECCC hadn't been established at this point, so the legal body was 
purely hypothetical).185 It is a non-profit, non-governmental, non-political organisation 
that brings lawyers, historians, activists and the general public together in order to 
"disseminate information on the Khmer Rouge regime based on our (sic) impartial 
inquiry into facts and history".186 
 
The official website of the DC-Cam uses emotive and powerful language to describe 
its mission, for example, "A society cannot know itself if it does not have an accurate 
memory of its own history. Toward this end, DC-Cam is working to reconstruct 
Cambodia’s modern history, much of which has been obscured by the flames of war 
and genocide."187 
 
According to their own records, DC-Cam has catalogued approximately 155,000 
pages of Khmer Rouge documents, 6,000 photographs and has approximately 
400,000 pages worth of documents still to catalogue. It has mapped 189 prisons, 
19,403 mass graves and 80 genocidal memorials throughout Cambodia.188  
 
Although the Cambodian government has been largely cooperative with DC-Cam, 
there have been a few instances of uncooperative behaviour. In 2003, after DC-Cam 
had put in an official request to review ninety reels of video footage from the Khmer 
Rouge years, these reels were sent to France from the Cambodian Ministry of 
Culture and Fine Arts' cinema department before the DC-Cam had the chance to 
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review them.189 This has led to suspicions that the reels contained incriminating 
evidence about the roles of some government members in the Khmer Rouge crimes.  
Searching for the Truth 
Searching for the Truth is a monthly magazine published by DC-Cam. It was first 
published in January 2000, and is distributed in Khmer, English and Cham. DC-Cam 
states that 80% of the 7,000 magazines published are distributed free of charge by 
themselves or other NGOs in the country.190 Summaries of the Khmer monthly 
editions are published quarterly in English and sold in Phnom Penh and Siem Riep. 
The magazine aims to, "disseminates the Center's work to the public, facilitates 
discourse on issues related to the Khmer Rouge, and otherwise promotes justice and 
reconciliation in Cambodia".191 
Hate Day 
In 1982, the Vietnamese backed ‘Salvation Government’ created a ‘Research 
Committee into the Crimes of the Pol Pot Regime’. The committee collected 
1,166,307 signatures recommending that 20th May should be devoted to 
commemorating the "suffering inflicted by the regime of Pol Pot, Ieng Sary and Khieu 
Samphan".192 This day has been translated into English as the "Day of Hate", while 
some suggest "Day of Maintaining Rage" would be a better translation.193 The day is 
still observed by the majority of Cambodians. 
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How successful has transitional justice been?  
Have the Khmer Rouge members been successfully punished and 
reintegrated into Cambodian society? 
In July 2010 the head of S-21 prison in Phnom Penh, Duch (Kaing Guek Eav) was 
found guilty of grave breaches of the Geneva Convention and crimes against 
humanity. Four other defendants are currently being tried. Therefore, from the 
viewpoint of traditional, retributive justice, the senior leaders of the Khmer Rouge 
have not been successfully punished.  
 
However, using a template of transitional, rather than retributive, justice, whether or 
not the Khmer Rouge themselves and Cambodian society as a whole, feels the 
leaders have been successfully punished and reintegrated into Cambodian society 
plays a much more important role than raw convictions in the ECCC. These criteria 
are related to the aims of transitional justice discussed earlier, namely: reconciliation 
('Is it possible for Khmer Rouge and victims to live side by side without risking further 
conflict?'; positive peace ('Is the conflict ongoing?'); justice ('Has justice been done?' 
or 'Do the Cambodian people feel justice has been done?'); healing (''Has the 
psychological trauma of the victims, and of the perpetrators, been addressed?'); 
forgiveness ('Has Cambodian society forgiven the Khmer Rouge?') and truth ('Has 
the truth been told?').  
 
These six categories form the basis of analysis of the effectiveness of transitional 
justice in Cambodia. To answer the aforementioned questions, a 2010 report by the 
Behandlungszentrum für Folteropfer Berlin (BZFO or Berlin Centre for the Treatment 
of Torture Victims) will be used.194 The report contains the results of two surveys. 
The first survey, completed in 2009, interviewed 1077 Khmer Rouge survivors (using 
two main criteria to define survivor status: born before 1975 and considers oneself a 
survivor of the Khmer Rouge years), of which 247 survivors had applied to be civil 
parties in one or more cases before the ECCC. NGO workers or Cambodian students 
specially trained by the authors undertook the interviews in the Khmer language. The 
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sample group represented all Cambodian provinces, both sexes, a wide age range 
and both literate and non-literate citizens. The survey only interviewed victims, and 
did not interview ex-Khmer Rouge soldiers or perpetrators of the crimes committed 
between 1975-79. As the survey was not random, but instead relied on volunteers, it 
is possible that the respondents were particularly interested in justice and the ECCC, 
and therefore viewed the ECCC more positively. 
 
 A second survey of the civil party applicants interviewed in the first survey was 
undertaken in November/December 2010. The purpose of this survey was to analyse 
the impact of the ECCC procedure on the willingness to forgive and reconcile. The 
results of this survey will be used in this chapter, but it is important to remember that 
the 2010 survey interviewed only those civil party applicants participating in the 
ECCC procedure that were interviewed in 2008/9. Therefore, the sample group is not 
representative of the sector of the Cambodian population that chose not to participate 
in these procedures.  
Reconciliation 
Two questions asked in the first BZFO survey are particularly relevant to the issue of 
reconciliation, namely: 'Are you ready to reconcile with the Khmer Rouge?' and 'Do 
you think reconciliation has occurred in your village?’195 When asked if they thought 
reconciliation had happened in their village, 70.7% of respondents answered with a 
definitive 'not at all', while only 3.5% answering 'totally'. The results for both questions 
show no discernable difference between those participating in the ECCC and those 
not.  
 
In answer to the first question, 47.9% of all respondents said they were 'not at all' 
ready to reconcile with the Khmer Rouge, with another 13.2% answering that they 
would 'rather not'. Only 13.2% said they ready 'to a large extent', and 3.2% said they 
were 'totally ready'. This question was asked again in 2010 and a marked 
improvement in the willingness to reconcile can be seen. 39.4% said they were 'not 
at all' ready, whereas 17.7% answered 'to a large extent' and 8.4% said they were 
'totally ready'.196 This suggests that those who participated in the Duch trial as civil 
parties are now more likely to reconcile with the Khmer Rouge than they were before. 
                                            
195 BZFO (2010), p31-32.  
196 BZFO (2010), p53 
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Whether this phenomenon can be extended to the population, as a whole cannot be 
ascertained based on the information available.  
 
In the 2008/9 and 2010 surveys, participants were asked if they thought the ECCC 
would contribute to reconciliation in Cambodia. In 2010, after the Duch verdict, 
positive feelings towards the ECCC rose with 61% answering yes (58.8% in 2008/9); 
34.8% answering in part (32.9% in 2008/9) and only 4.3% answering no (8.2% in 
2008/9).197 This suggests that the tribunal and the civil participation that went along 
with it helped contribute to a willingness to reconcile in Cambodia.  
Positive Peace 
When asked if there is still conflict between the Khmer Rouge and non-Khmer 
Rouge, 90% of respondents not participating in the ECCC (and 92.1% of civil party 
participants) denied this was the case.198 Therefore, transitional justice in Cambodia 
is dealing with the aftermath of a conflict, rather than an ongoing one.  
Justice 
When asked if they thought the ECCC would contribute to reconciliation in 
Cambodia, 53.9% answered yes, 30.6% in part and 12.8% answered no.199 This 
suggests there was great hope for the ECCC in 2008-9, before the Duch verdict was 
handed down.  
 
In 2010, after the Duch verdict had been handed down, the BZFO conducted a 
second survey with the civil party interviewees to analyse the changes since the 
ECCC's first case. Duch was given a 35 year prison sentence, but this was cut down 
to 19 years on account of years already served. 38.7% of those surveyed in 2010 
were 'satisfied' with this sentence, and 25.3% were 'very satisfied'.200 24.9% 
answered that they were 'unsatisfied' or 'very unsatisfied'.201 
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Healing 
When asked if they still feared the Khmer Rouge, 49% said 'not at all', and 8.8% said 
'totally'.202 30.9% of civil party participants answered 'rather yes', as opposed to 
23.9% of non-participants; suggesting participation in the ECCC proceedings 
increases the threat (perceived or otherwise) of repercussions from the Khmer 
Rouge.  
 
When asked if they have feelings of revenge towards the Khmer Rouge, 34% 
answered 'not at all', 10.8% 'rather not', 14.8% 'in part', 21.3% to a large extent and 
19.2% 'totally'.203 Interestingly, those participating in the ECCC felt more need for 
revenge (33.6% answered 'totally') than non-participants (14.9% answered 'totally'). 
This suggests either those who participate had pre-existing feelings of revenge 
towards the Khmer Rouge, or the ECCC procedures have brought the feelings out.  
Forgiveness 
When asked 'Did you forgive the Khmer Rouge?’ 45.5% of all respondents answered 
'not at all', while only 4% answered 'totally'.204 Once again, ECCC participants 
showed a tendency to not forgive the Khmer Rouge (56.3% answered 'not at all', 
compared with 42.3% of non participants). However, the total results show that the 
Cambodian people as a whole have not forgiven the Khmer Rouge for their crimes 
thirty years after the event.  
Truth 
There were no questions aimed at finding out the extent to which those surveyed felt 
they knew the truth about the Khmer Rouge crimes. However, the lack of a truth 
commission and genocide education in schools and the general population show that 
there has been very little attempt to educate the people about what happened 
between 1975-9.  
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Have democracy and human rights been allowed to flourish? 
The overarching aim of transitional justice is to ensure justice without disrupting the 
transition to democracy. To help address the question of democracy and human 
rights in Cambodia, the three data sets discussed earlier will be used.  The table 
below shows Cambodia's Freedom House and Political Terror Scale scores at nine 
different points between 1976 to the present day: 
Year Freedom 
House205 
PTS206 
 
1970 Data not 
available 
Data not 
available 
1976 6 (PR) 
6 (CL) 
NOT FREE 
5 (AI)  
5 (USSD) 
1978 7 (PR) 
7 (CL) 
NOT FREE 
5 (AI) 
5 (USSD) 
1981 7 (PR) 
7 (CL) 
NOT FREE 
3 (AI) 
3 (USSD) 
1985 7 (PR) 
7 (CL) 
NOT FREE 
3 (AI)  
4 (USSD) 
1990 7 (PR) 
7 (CL) 
NOT FREE 
3 (AI) 
4 (USSD) 
1995 6 (PR) 3 (AI) 
                                            
205 Freedom House Scale is split into three scores: PR = political rights; CL = civil 
liberties and the freedom score (not free, partly free, free). Data for this table taken 
from the Freedom House website, accessed at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2010&country=7794 on 
5 May 2011.  
206 Data for this table is from the Political Terror Scale website, accessed at 
http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/countries.php?region=Eurasia&country=Cambodia 
on 5 May 2011. They offer two different scores based on two different data sources: 
AI =based on Amnesty International sources and USSD = based on US State 
Department sources.  
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6 (CL) 
NOT FREE207 
4 (USSD) 
2000 6 (PR) 
6 (CL) 
NOT FREE 
3 (AI) 
2 (USSD) 
2005 6 (PR) 
5 (CL) 
NOT FREE 
3 (AI) 
3 (USSD) 
2009 6 (PR) 
5 (CL) 
NOT FREE 
3 (AI) 
3 (USSD) 
 
As the Political Terror Scale clearly shows, there was very little regard for human and 
civil rights in Cambodia during the Khmer Rouge years. In fact, from 1976 to 1979, 
Cambodia consistently scored a five on the PTS scale, meaning that the entire 
population was affected in some way by murder, disappearances and wrongful 
imprisonment and the Khmer Rouge leadership would stop at nothing to achieve its 
ideological aims. Since 1981, according to Amnesty International figures, Cambodia 
has scored a three, meaning while political imprisonment and human rights abuses 
are common, a relatively small proportion of the population (normally those who 
express their political opinions in public) is affected.208 This is a marked improvement 
from the Khmer Rouge era.  
 
However, there has not been a tremendous improvement based on both the statistics 
from the US State Department and Amnesty International. The average score has 
been 3 since 1981, whereas one would have expected a dramatic improvement after 
the UN sponsored elections and new democratic government in the 1990s. However, 
events in Cambodian politics during the mid to late 1990s can explain these 
disappointing scores. In the May 1993 elections, a coalition between FUNICINPEC 
                                            
207 This data is for 1995-1996. Between 1993-1995 the results for Cambodia were 
significantly better, with political rights (PR) at 4 and civil liberties (CL) at 5. 
Cambodia was considered to be 'partly free'. The sudden deterioration in democracy 
is partly due to the fact the Khmer Rouge were outlawed as a political party in 1994.  
208 Definitions from thePolitical Terror Scale website, accessed at 
http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/countries.php?region=Eurasia&country=Cambodia 
on 5 May 2011 
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(Prince Ranariddh) and the Cambodian People's Party (Hun Sen) was formed and 
remained intact until 1997. Each party kept their own military wings.  
 
 In 1997, factional fighting between the two coalition members broke out, which 
ended in a coup by Hun Sen and the CPP. FUNICINPEC members were forced into 
exile, and CPP forces shot those who refused. Between 40-60 FUNCINPEC military 
generals were assassinated during this period, which paralysed FUNCINPEC's 
military. In a country where 24% of the voting population admit they base their 
decision who to vote for purely on which party can best 'keep the peace', the state of 
the party's military can make or break an election.209 
 
In 1998, FUNCINPEC leaders returned from exile and new elections were called but 
the run up to the elections was marked by violence and intimidation of non-CPP 
candidates.210 Since 1998, the situation has been stable but the threat of inter party 
violence remains strong, the press is heavily censored and although technically a 
democracy, Cambodia scores very low on all political freedom scales shown.  
 
Polity IV results between 1953-2009 are shown in the diagram below: 
                                            
209 Hughes, Caroline, 'Cambodia's Performance', accessed at 
http://www.phnompenh.um.dk/NR/rdonlyres/5CA62869-40F3-4B61-BDC4-
6589B75900FB/0/CambodiasPerformance.pdf on 6 June 2011, p8.  
210 BBC News, 'Cambodia Election Violence Condemned', 24th July 1998, accessed 
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/138445.stm on 2 June 2011.  
  66 
211 
 
 
 
The Polity IV diagram represents the openness of politics in Cambodia, including 
political participation, participation in the civil service and the executive (either the 
King or government) and constraints on the executive. Between 1953-1970, King 
Sihanouk ruled Cambodia, and political participation was very limited, which 
accounts for the low score given by Polity. Between 1970-75 the US sponsored Lon 
Nol regime offered slightly more freedom (shown by the second green line) but the 
pattern was disturbed in 1975 by the Khmer Rouge (shown by the sharply decreasing 
black line). The Vietnamese sponsored PRK did not achieve a higher score than the 
lowest score of the Khmer Rouge, and scores only started to climb after the Paris 
Peace Accords in 1991. Scores continued to climb until 1997, when the Hun Sen 
government was accused of intimidating the opposition. Thereafter, scores began to 
climb and have been consistently around the 2 mark since 2000. According to Polity 
IV, +6 is considered a democracy and -6 an autocracy.212 
 
                                            
211 Diagram from the Polity IV website, 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/cam2.htm accessed on 23rd June 2011.  
212 See Polity IV Country Report Series Explanatory Notes, at 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/keynew.htm accessed on 23rd June 2011.  
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Although there have not been great improvements in political freedom, democracy 
and human rights in Cambodia since the Paris Peace Accords in 1991, the scores 
also do not show any signs of democracy and human rights being put at risk by 
attempts to bring the Khmer Rouge to justice. In 2005, the ECCC began its activities 
in Cambodia and since then the scores in all three data sets have remained the 
same, suggesting that political rights, civil liberties and human rights have not been 
affected by the ECCC procedures.  
 
Transitional justice aims to bring perpetrators to justice, while healing rifts, 
encouraging reconciliation while supporting the transition to democracy. If the BZFO 
survey statistics are taken to be representative of the Cambodian population, 
willingness to forgive and reconcile with the Khmer Rouge is still low, despite the 
three decades between the genocide and the present day. While the statistics show 
the ECCC has made a positive impact on the willingness to forgive and reconcile, 
this impact has been relatively small. The lack of reconciliation and forgiveness, the 
absence of a truth commission and the stagnant statistics relating to democracy and 
civil rights mean that transitional justice in Cambodia cannot be described as a 
success.  
  68 
 
The (post) Cold War Context 
1979-1994 : Genocide Justice Through A Cold War Lens 
Cambodia's UN Seat 
The question of who should represent Cambodia at the United Nations arose shortly 
after the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in January 1979. On 11th January 1979, 
one day before the declaration of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, an 
emergency UN Security Council meeting was called to discuss the Cambodian 
problem. Prince Sihanouk, under orders from Pol Pot, was flown in to New York (on a 
Chinese plane, with Chinese political and financial support) to argue that the Khmer 
Rouge should maintain control of the Cambodian UN seat.213 In this meeting, China 
called for all foreign troops to leave Cambodian soil and the motion was passed with 
thirteen of fifteen countries in support.214 
 
In the months that followed Prince Sihanouk, no longer under Khmer Rouge control, 
changed sides on the UN seat issue and wrote an open letter urging all member 
states to vote against the Khmer Rouge. In reference to the continued recognition of 
the Khmer Rouge as the official representatives of Cambodia, he wrote: 
 "International morals have decidedly declined rather deeply today when 
 honest people and whom we all know to be murderers, work together in 
 perfect serenity".215 
He then called for the Cambodian seat to be left vacant until it can be established 
who the national government was. He was joined by Bulgaria, who challenged the 
Khmer Rouge's right to represent the Cambodian people, and by Congo, who also 
argued the Cambodian seat should be left open.216  
 
                                            
213 Fawthorp and Jarvis (2004), p26  
214 Fawthorp and Jarvis (2004), p26  
215 Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia, 'An Open Letter to Member States of the UN 
from Prince Norodom Sihanouk', dated September 1979, in Fawthorp and Jarvis 
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However, the China, the United States and other western nationals were putting 
force behind the pro-Khmer Rouge campaign. When the case was put before the 
Credentials Committee, US delegate Robert Rosenstock argued that the UN should 
not be concerned about how a country treats its own people, but rather about 
technicalities, and as the Khmer Rouge credentials had been accepted in 1978, they 
should be accepted again in 1979. He was quoted as saying, 'I was told to engineer 
the result on the Credentials Committee, so I engineered the result'.217 The 
Credentials Committee found in favour of the Khmer Rouge six votes to three.218  
 
The last step for the Sino-American campaign was to get the Credentials Committee 
findings validated by the UN General Assembly. This vote took place in late 1979 and 
was passed 71 (notably from China, the United States, United Kingdom and Canada) 
votes to 35 (from the Soviet Bloc and some Non-Aligned Movement countries), with 
34 abstentions from countries like Sweden and France.219  
 
Of the countries that abstained, some did so because none of the claimants had 
sufficient control of Cambodian territory to warrant the United Nations seat, and 
others did so out of humanitarian reasons. For these countries, it was impossible to 
vote in favour of a genocidal regime but equally as distasteful to vote in favour of an 
imperialistic Vietnamese regime. On the pro-Khmer Rouge side, anti Vietnamese 
spirit won out, with Robert Rosenstock (US delegation) explaining, "The choice for us 
was between moral principles and international law. The scale weighed in favour of 
law, because that also served our national interests".220 In other words, the threat of 
a 'domino effect' of Soviet sponsored Vietnamese communism in South East Asia 
was enough for the United States and other western nations to ignore their 'moral 
principles' and vote according to Realpolitik.  
 
In addition to the 1979 vote, UN General Assembly votes on the Cambodian issue 
were undertaken at regular intervals in the 1980s. The general voting patterns of the 
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respective Cold War blocs did not change throughout this period, although there 
were some exceptions. Australia voted for the Khmer Rouge in 1979, but by 1980-2 it 
abstained from voting on the issue. In 1982, the new Coalition Government of 
Democratic Kampuchea (dominated by the Khmer Rouge, but also including King 
Sihanouk's FUNCINPEC and Son Senn) represented Cambodia at the UN and this 
decision was no longer challenged by Vietnam and the Soviet Union. As such, a 
Khmer Rouge dominated representation of Cambodia at the United Nations had 
become status quo.  
 
Cambodia as a Victim of the Cold War 
Sino-Cambodian Relations 
Given the ideological similarities between the two Communist parties, Cambodia's 
strategic and geographic importance to China and the mutual enemy of Vietnam, it is 
perhaps not surprising that China was the Khmer Rouge's biggest international 
supporter, both between 1975 and 1979, and after the Vietnamese invasion.  
 
As a result of Sino-Soviet tensions and subsequent Soviet aid to Vietnam, China 
sought to ally itself with the Khmer Rouge regime between 1975-79. Robert Ross 
claims that since the fall of Saigon (Ho Chi Minh City) in 1975, "China's one 
overriding objective has been to minimise Soviet influence on its Southern 
periphery".221 By August 1975, there were already over 100 Chinese 'technical 
advisors' in Cambodia, and Pol Pot was receiving arms shipments through the port of 
Sihanoukville.222 The number of advisors rose to 15,000 in 1978. With this number of 
advisors on the ground in the country, it is therefore difficult to imagine that the 
Chinese government stance that it did not know about the genocide before 1979 is 
true.  
 
Deng Xiaoping publicly supported Pol Pot in 1984, when he said, "I do not 
understand why some people want to remove Pol Pot. It is true that he made some 
mistakes in the past but now he is leading the fight against the Vietnamese 
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aggressors.“223 According to US intelligence, China gave Khmer Rouge $100m in 
military support in the 1980s, which enabled them to fight the civil war with the 
Vietnamese backed People's Republic of Kampuchea.224 China even invaded 
Vietnam in February 1979, to put pressure on the Vietnamese to withdraw from 
Cambodia. However, the Chinese encountered more resistance in Vietnam than they 
had reckoned with and withdrew in March 1979, leaving the Khmer Rouge to fend for 
themselves.  
 
Relations with China continue to play a pivotal role in Cambodia. Although 
traditionally an ally of the Khmer Rouge, Hun Sen and the Cambodian People's Party 
have been warming to the Chinese since the early 1990s. In 2006, Prime Minister 
Hun Sen described China as "Cambodia's most trustworthy friend".225 During the 
Paris Peace Agreements in 1991, both the CPP and FUNCINPEC were suspicious of 
Chinese involvement, and disappointed when not even the Chinese could stop the 
Khmer Rouge from reneging on their Paris Peace Agreement commitments in 
1992.226 
 
After the UN sponsored elections in 1993, China favoured FUNCINPEC and Prince 
Ranariddah (at that time the joint Prime Minister) but in 1996, as a result of 
FUNCINPEC's pro-Taiwanese attitude, swapped allegiances and favoured coalition 
partner Hun Sen.227 Since the 1997 coup, Sino-Cambodian relations have been 
steadily improving. In July 1997, the United States House of Representatives 
denounced the ousting of Prince Rannarridh and FUNCINPEC as a military coup, 
which resulted in a US led international opposition against Hun Sen.228 Despite 
                                            
223 Kiernan, Ben, 'Cambodia's Twisted Path to Justice', The History Place (1999), 
accessed at http://www.historyplace.com/pointsofview/kiernan.htm  
224 Ibid 
225 Remark made at the conclusion of a two day visit by Premier Wen Jiabao 7-8 
April 1996. Over 10 bilateral agreements were made during this trip, including $600 
billion worth of loans and grants. Reported in: Storey, Ian 'China's Tightening 
Relationship with Cambodia', China Brief, Vol 6, Issue 9 (2006) 
226 Kosal, Long, 'Sino-Cambodian Relations', Cambodian Institute for Cooperation 
and Peace Working Papers Collection, No. 28 (2009), p6 
227 Storey, Ian (2006).  
228 United States House of Representatives, Resolution 195, passed 28th July 1997. 
This opposition also led to critcism from the UN and ASEAN delaying Cambodia's 
admission date (which was originally 10 July 1997).  
  72 
international pressure, China remained silent on the issue and even delivered $2.8 
million worth of military equipment to Cambodia shortly after the July 1997 crisis.229  
 
In addition to political support, China has provided a substantial amount of aid and 
investment in Cambodia since 1991. Between 1992 and 1998, China contributed 
over US$46 million to Cambodia.230 All of this aid and investment was given without 
conditions, such as respect for human rights, fair governance or freedom of speech, 
which all other countries (including the US, Japan and EU countries) place on aid.  
 
The Chinese have campaigned against any international involvement in a possible 
Cambodian genocide trial since the idea was first floated by US lawyers in the 
1980s.231 Etcheson emphasises the fact that for China to advocate holding a 
government responsible for millions of deaths during a revolution would be "a very 
dangerous precedent indeed".232  China remains the only member of the Security 
Council that is not in favour of a tribunal. To combat the possibility of a Chinese veto, 
the efforts to establish a tribunal were made by the United Nations General 
Assembly.  
Soviet-Cambodian Relations 
After the unification of Vietnam in 1975, the Soviet Union was one of the biggest aid 
donors to Hanoi. As a result of tensions between Beijing and Hanoi, China cut off aid 
to Vietnam in 1978, leaving the Soviet Union as Vietnam's most important source of 
military and economic assistance. In June 1978 Vietnam joined the Comecon and in 
November 1978 the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed between 
Vietnam and the Soviet Union.233 The Soviet Union also provided a large amount of 
humanitarian aid to Cambodia. In 1987, the Soviets projected that aid to Cambodia 
between 1979-90 would reach 284 million rubles.234 High profile collaborations, such 
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as the Kampuchea-USSR Friendship Hospital, the Kampuchea-USSR Friendship 
Technical Institute and Russian language centres, were all funded by Soviet money.  
 
As a result of close Vietnamese-Soviet relations, and even closer Cambodian-
Vietnamese relations after 1979, it was perhaps inevitable that Soviet-Cambodian 
relations would grow closer as well. In 1983, the first trade agreement between the 
Soviet Union and Cambodia was agreed, increasing Soviet trade turnover in 
Cambodia from 71.8 million rubles in 1983 to 100.3 million rubles in 1985.235 In 1986, 
the two countries signed a trade and aid agreement. Therefore, the two countries 
were on good terms during the 1979-1990 period. There was no official military 
support from the Soviet Union to the PRK, as this was provided by Vietnam (using 
Soviet equipment and finance).  
 
Despite the fact the Soviet Union channelled all military support for the PRK through 
Vietnam, Soviet support of Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia was a sticking point 
in Sino-Soviet rapprochement. In 1982, China outlined three conditions for 
rapprochement: 
• reduced Soviet military presence along the Sino-Soviet border 
• withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan 
• withdrawal of support for the Vietnamese in Cambodia.236 
In 1989, after a meeting between Deng Xiaoping and Mikhail Gorbachev (where 
complete withdrawal from Cambodia and free elections were discussed), Hanoi 
announced an initial 50,000-75,000-troop reduction, which would be followed by 
complete withdrawal by September 1989.237 This led Morris to write, "Vietnamese 
inability to eliminate the Cambodian resistance, combined with drying up of 
Soviet aid forced an end of the direct Vietnamese presence in Cambodia".238 
Therefore, there was a negative correlation between Sino-Soviet relations and Soviet 
support for the Vietnamese and PRK in Cambodia.  
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US Foreign Policy 
During the latter years of the Cold War, US Cambodian policy was largely dictated by 
the Reagan Doctrine, a policy of supporting anti-government guerrillas and 
resistance movements that helped to roll back Soviet backed communist regimes in 
Asia, Latin America and Africa. After the fall of Phnom Penh to the Vietnamese in 
January 1979, the Khmer Rouge forces fell into this category, and as such were 
supported by the United States on the Thai-Cambodian border.  
 
In April 1975, as the Khmer Rouge took  Phnom Penh, the Vietnam War was still 
fresh in the minds of US officials, and therefore anti-Vietnamese sentiment dictated 
their policy towards the Khmer Rouge. The meeting between the US Secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger and the Thai Foreign Minister Chatchai Chunhawan on 26th 
November 1975 gives an insight into US policy concerns in South East Asia during 
the Khmer Rouge period.239 In this meeting, Kissinger remarked: 
 "You should also tell the Cambodians we will be friends with them. They are 
 murderous thugs, but we won't let that stand in our way. We are prepared to 
 improve relations with them. Tell them the latter part, but don't tell them what I 
 said before".240 
This shows that the US was fully aware of the killings happening inside Cambodia, 
even though the meeting happened just seven months after the Khmer Rouge took 
Phnom Penh, but was prepared to ignore them. The reason for this is clear when 
Kissinger states, "We would like them [Cambodia] to be independent as a 
counterweight to Vietnam" and failing this, "We would prefer to have Laos and 
Cambodia aligned with China rather than with North Vietnam".241 In a December 
1975 meeting with Suharto of Indonesia, Kissinger repeated these sentiments, 
stating, "We don't like Cambodia, for the government in many ways is worse than 
Vietnam, but we would like it to be independent. We don't discourage Thailand or 
China from drawing closer to Cambodia".242 
                                            
239 United States State Department, 'Memorandum of Conversation: Secretary's 
Meeting with Foreign Minister Chatchai of Thailand', 26th November 1975, document 
number 7524631.  
240 US State Department, doc no. 7524631, p8.  
241 US State Department, doc no. 7524631, p3-4.  
242 US State Department, 'Telgram from US Embassy in Jakarta to Secretary of State 
in Washington re: President Ford - Suharto Meeting',  6th December 1975, document 
number 051972, p3.  
  75 
 
Therefore, even in 1975, the US was afraid the Vietnamese would gain influence in 
Cambodia, thus giving the Soviets another satellite state in South East Asia to 
counter this, they were willing to overlook politically motivated killings (and later, 
genocide) to ensure Cambodia remained independent or under Chinese influence. 
This support for the Khmer Rouge continued after they were ousted from power by 
the Vietnamese in 1979. 
 
However, the United States never openly associated itself with the Khmer Rouge. 
Former U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski stated, "I encouraged the 
Chinese to support Pol Pot. Pol Pot was an abomination. We could never support 
him, but China could.“ 243 This shows that the United States was very aware that it 
was a global campaigner for human rights, and associating with the Khmer Rouge 
would have damaged this image, but the Khmer Rouge and their anti-Soviet, anti-
Vietnamese policies were still preferable to a Soviet orientated Vietnamese puppet 
regime.  
 
Even towards the end of the Cold War, the US still backed the Khmer Rouge. After 
1988, Thailand became more market orientated but were warned by U.S. officials 
that, "if Thailand abandoned the Cambodian resistance and its leader Sihanouk for 
the sake of doing business with Phnom Penh it would have to pay a price."244 United 
States dedication to the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese resistance can be seen 
through their dedication to ensuring the Khmer Rouge (or a coalition containing the 
Khmer Rouge) kept the Cambodian UN seat.  
 
However, since the end of the Cold War, the United States has changed its policy. 
After Vietnamese withdrawal, United Nations intervention and the UN sponsored 
1991 Paris Agreements that ended the Cambodian Civil War; the US has been 
willing to consider the idea of a tribunal. In 1994, the US Congress passed the 
Cambodian Genocide Act, which established Yale's Cambodian Genocide Program. 
This program collects information that could help any future tribunal, and has set up 
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the Documentation Center of Cambodia, which collects data, witness statements and 
information about perpetrators.  
Internal Problems : Border Clashes with the Khmer Rouge 
Although Phnom Penh officially fell to the Vietnamese on 7th January 1979, the 
Khmer Rouge, and after 1982, Khmer People's National Liberation Armed Forces 
(KPNLAF) continued to attack PRK forces from their jungle base on the Thai 
Cambodia border until, and after, the Paris Peace Accords in 1991.  
 
Khmer Rouge, and later Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea forces, 
continued to launch guerrilla attacks on PRK forces throughout the 1980s. These 
attacks were most frequent in old Khmer Rouge stronghold areas in the northwestern 
Cambodia (around the provinces of Battambang and Siem Riep). It is estimated that 
the Khmer Rouge National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK) was comprised 
of 40,000-50,000 men (although official figures were never released), and the 
majority of the new members (those recruited after 1979) were recruited from the 
refugee camps on the Thai border.245 China supplied the NADK with ammunition and 
supplies, which were delivered by boat through Thai ports.246 
 
Infighting between the Khmer Rouge and the other coalition members meant that the 
insurgents were not capable of overthrowing the Vietnamese forces. However, they 
were capable of causing day-to-day disruptions and create stalemate. This was 
enough to divert PRK attention away from governing the country and capturing the 
Khmer Rouge leaders and putting them on trial.  
Regional Problems : Vietnam  
As previously discussed, part of the reason for Khmer Rouge popularity in 1975 was 
their nationalist, anti-Vietnamese ideology. Soon after they seized power in April 
1975, border clashes started on the Northeastern border. In 1977, these border 
clashes intensified, and in September 1977 over 1,000 Vietnamese civilians were 
killed in border attacks.247 In early 1978, the Vietnamese leadership decided to 
support the anti Pol Pot resistance. In May 1978, Radio Phnom Penh, the official 
Khmer Rouge radio station, announced that if every Cambodian killed at least 30 
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Vietnamese, only two million troops would be needed to eliminate the entire 
Vietnamese population.248 As a result of Khmer Rouge belligerence and massacres 
of ethnic Vietnamese within Cambodian borders, the Vietnamese invaded Cambodia 
on 22nd December 1978. On 7th January 1979, Phnom Penh fell and the People's 
Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) was set up with political, military and economic help 
from the Vietnamese. The PRK was commonly known in the West as a Vietnamese 
'puppet regime'.  
 
The military campaign and economic support for the PRK was largely financed by the 
Soviet Union, via Hanoi. In 1978, Hanoi received US$800 million in military aid from 
the Soviet Union.249 This figure rose sharply to US$1.4 billion in 1979, in order to 
finance the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia.250 In 1985, this figure was US$1.5 
billion, which shows the cost of the Cambodian invasion and also the fact the Soviets 
were willing to pay for it.251  
Regional Problems : Thailand 
Just four days after the Vietnamese overthrew the Khmer Rouge, Thailand's Prime 
Minister General Kriangsak Chomanand announced it would continue to recognise 
Democratic Kampuchea (and the Khmer Rouge government), rather than the newly 
proclaimed, Vietnamese backed, People's Republic of Kampuchea.  
 
Thailand was also involved in a Sino-Thai effort to rebuild the Khmer Rouge and 
prime them to topple the newly installed regime. In 1979, the Chinese urged 
Chomanand to harbour Khmer Rouge refugees and to allow Thai territory to be used 
as a pipeline for arms and other supplies from China to the Khmer Rouge.252 Helen 
Jarvis and Tom Fawthorp allege that, after 1979, a number of Thai army special units 
were set up with the sole purpose of coordinating with the Khmer Rouge and 
planning an anti-Vietnamese strike from Thai soil.253  
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1994-2011 : Genocide Justice at the 'End of History' 
Regional Politics  
Since 1989, there has also been a lack of consensus in the ASEAN on the topic of 
genocide trials in Cambodia. One of the most vocal members of the ASEAN is 
Vietnam, who views its work regarding a tribunal as accomplished after the People's 
Revolutionary Tribunal in 1979. Since the rapprochement between the People's 
Republic of China and the Vietnamese Communist Party, the Vietnamese have been 
less vocal on the topic, wary of China's strong opposition to another tribunal in 
Cambodia. However, the Vietnamese People's Army and its official newspaper were 
still highly critical of Hun Sen's suggestion that the Cambodian people should "dig a 
hole and bury the past", and published an article demanding a new tribunal after the 
surrender of Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan, stating "crimes cannot be forgotten 
and must be punished".254 
 
Cambodian Internal Politics 
Since the Vietnamese troops withdrew from Cambodia in 1989, there has only been 
slow progress in genocide justice. The ruling party, the Cambodian People's Party 
(CPP) and the Khmer Rouge both trace their roots to the same founding conference 
in 1951, and the similarities between the Khmer Rouge and the Cambodian 
government do not end there. Craig Etcheson states that most of the CPP's senior 
members started their careers as low or medium level Khmer Rouge cadres who fled 
to Vietnam during Pol Pot's purges between 1975-9.255 Prime Minister Hun Sen is 
among this group. it is therefore not surprising that there was a lack of consensus 
within the ruling party about whether a tribunal should take place. Hun Sen continues 
to oppose any additional ECCC trials, seeing the current five detainees as the last 
cases for the genocide tribunal, and reiterated this point of view in a meeting with the 
UN Secretary General in October 2010.256 
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Some elements of Cambodian politics have been traditionally supportive of the idea 
of a genocide tribunal. On element, named the 'Internationalists' by Etcheson, have 
long argued that UN involvement in a tribunal would be of great benefit to Cambodia 
in the form of bilateral and multilateral aid and would gain credibility for the 
Cambodian government on the regional and international stage. Etcheson also states 
the modernising faction within the CPP have traditionally been in favour of a tribunal, 
seeing it as an opportunity to remove undesirable elements of the party (i.e. those 
with Khmer Rouge associations) and to reinforce the need for a strong judiciary 
system.257 They view the lack of a competent judiciary as an impediment to foreign 
investment and economic development.  
 
Outside of the ruling party, there are other elements of Cambodian politics that have 
argued for a tribunal. The Sam Rainsey Party opposed the government's planned 
tribunal, arguing instead that a UN sponsored Hague style tribunal that would charge 
the Prime Minister Hun Sen with genocide crimes.258  Etcheson argues that the Sam 
Rainsey Party enjoys "strong backing" from the Republican sector of the US House 
of Representatives, who see Hun Sen as the biggest obstacle to genocide justice.259 
In addition, Prince Ranariddah has also stated that UN involvement would be 
necessary. After the UN withdrew from negotiations in February 2002, he stated, "I 
don't believe that the tribunal process will follow that required in a court of law and 
within a justice framework, even if there is participation of foreign judges".260 
However, this statement should not be mistaken for support for the tribunal on the 
part of Ranariddah or his party FUNCINPEC, who have been ambivalent about their 
standpoint. The Prince was even absent for the final vote on the Khmer Rouge 
tribunal law, stating he had to attend a birthday party instead.261 
 
However, certain elements of both the ruling party and the opposition parties in 
Cambodia have traditionally opposed the idea of genocide trials. The 'Nativists' have 
argued against any UN involvement in Cambodian affairs, including the punishment 
of genocide. After over a century of foreign involvement in Cambodia (from French 
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colonialism, Japanese occupation, US intervention to the most recent Vietnamese 
occupation), it is easy to see why some Cambodian politicians have been uneasy 
about the idea of more foreign involvement in Cambodia. In addition to this, the 
'Rejectionists' in the CPP have argued that any reopening of old wounds (i.e. 
prosecution of the perpetrators of genocide) could be fatal for Cambodia's uneasy 
ceasefire between the Khmer Rouge and the government.  
 
The Khmer Rouge has been giving weight to the argument that trials could 
jeopardise the ceasefire between the Khmer Rouge and the government. A Khmer 
Rouge spokesperson at a Battambang public meeting in January 2000 stated: 
 "Despite the end of the war, nobody can affirm that the war will not happen 
 again in our country, especially random attacks that disturb development work. 
 So, the peace we are enjoying today is still fragile"262 
Similarly, Khieu Samphan, a former high ranking Khmer Rouge official who is now on 
trial by the ECCC, founded in 2005, stated in 1998 that, "If we have to say who was 
wrong and who was right, etc. etc, we cannot have national reconciliation. We cannot 
put an end to the war."263 
 
Despite the official line of the Khmer Rouge, even before 2005 there was evidence to 
show that some members of the Khmer Rouge had started to question the events of 
1975-1979. In January 2000, the Center for Social Development, a Cambodian NGO, 
organised a 'national reconciliation forum' in traditionally Khmer Rouge territory in 
Battambang City. 75% of the attendees were Khmer Rouge affiliated, and only one 
speaker spoke out in favour of the genocide trials. However, 75% of the same 
audience responded in favour of genocide trials of the old Khmer Rouge leaders in 
an anonymous questionnaire distributed among the crowd.264 Therefore, even within 
the Khmer Rouge party itself, and more so within Cambodian politics as a whole, 
there was no consensus on the genocide trial question.  
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Concluding Remarks 
 
Since its independence in 1953, events within Cambodia have been strongly 
influenced by regional and international factors. The Vietnam War, the Cold War and,  
most recently, the post Cold War push towards democratisation have all left their 
mark on Cambodia. The crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge during 1975-79 did 
not occur in a vacuum, and as such external factors have also affected how the 
genocide has been dealt with.  
 
As previously discussed, some historians see the Cold War, and more specifically 
the impact of the Vietnam War on Cambodia as the catalyst for the genocide in 
Cambodia.265 This point of view does not discount the impact of Maoist ideology on 
the Khmer Rouge or deny the existence of a communist movement in Cambodia 
before the Vietnam War, but rather suggests that without the Vietnam War and the 
US bombing of Cambodia in the late 1960s and early 1970s, it is unlikely the Khmer 
Rouge would have been able to gain such a support base among the rural peasants 
in Cambodia. In other words, the impact of the Vietnam War on Cambodia allowed 
the Khmer Rouge to exploit dissatisfaction with the Sihanouk and Lon Nol 
governments and gain support for their unique, extreme brand of Maoist-nationalist 
revolution.  
 
If the Cold War played a role in the Khmer Rouge's ascension to power, it played an 
even bigger role in the ensuing impunity regarding the excesses of 1975-9. It was 
Cold War tensions and Sino-Western suspicions of the Vietnamese in Indochina that 
ensured the Khmer Rouge could continue representing Cambodia at the United 
Nations, alone until 1982 and as part of a coalition until 1991. Chinese weapons and 
expertise meant that the Khmer Rouge could continue to fight against the 
Vietnamese sponsored PRK (also a Soviet orientated communist state) until well into 
the 1990s. The joint Sino-American effort to ensure Thailand and other ASEAN 
countries isolated Vietnam and Vietnamese influenced states (including Cambodia) 
both politically and economically was also successful. Throughout the 1980s, the 
PRK faced daily security problems in the form of skirmishes and clashes with Khmer 
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Rouge and other rebel forces and had to rely on economic support from Vietnam and 
the Soviet Union after Western and Chinese embargoes were imposed in the 1980s. 
This created a situation where the state had to fight for survival, and was in no state 
to search for (well hidden and protected) Khmer Rouge leaders, put them on trial and 
give victims justice.  
 
The end of the 1980s and early 1990s, beginning with Sino-Soviet rapprochement 
and ending with the breaking up of the Soviet Union, brought in winds of change. The 
end of the Cold War, the beginning of the 'end of history' and the era of 
democratisation brought new challenges for the new, democratic Cambodian state. 
The idea that liberal democracy was the pinnacle of political development was 
seized. However, it was impossible to implement a successful liberal democracy, 
celebrating human rights, a strong and fair judiciary and political freedom, before 
ending two decades of impunity regarding the genocidal policies of the Khmer 
Rouge. Therefore, the triumph of the liberal democracy and the accompanying 
ideology gave the international community and the new Cambodian government 
impetus to implement a transitional justice scenario in Cambodia and seek justice for 
the millions of Khmer Rouge victims.  
 
However, the transformation from authoritarian communist state to liberal democracy 
has not been as straightforward as hoped. As discussed while analysing the state of 
Cambodian democracy, there are still serious problems pertaining to political 
freedom, human rights and corruption. These problems do not just affect the quality 
of democracy in Cambodia, but also the effectiveness of transitional justice. 
Concerns have been raised about the independence of the judiciary, even among the 
Cambodian judges participating in the ECCC. Hudson Kingston states that 
Cambodian judges often face threats of violence if they do not rule the way they are 
supposed to, and even when they are allowed to rule fairly, the rulings are often not 
accepted by the government.266 Political involvement in the judicial system was 
evident in 2009 when Prime Minister Hun Sen said the tribunal should stop 
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prosecuting after the existing five detainees have been tried.267 In response to this, 
the ECCC's international judge Sylvia Cartwright stated, "comments, politically 
motivated or otherwise, which appear to interfere with [the court's] independence, 
should be deplored".268 However, in a country where the government regularly uses 
the judicial system as a means to repress its opponents, the possibility of political 
interference in the ECCC procedure has to be taken seriously.269  
 
The future of transitional justice in Cambodia does not look bright if it carries on in its 
current form. Tribunal heavy justice, as seen in Cambodia, can only achieve so 
much. All senior Khmer Rouge leaders have either already been indicted, or are 
already dead, and the ECCC is under political pressure to finish its investigations. 
Yet studies have shown Cambodian society is still divided and the Khmer Rouge 
crimes have not been forgotten. Cambodian and international NGOs and civil society 
have made attempts to introduce other transitional justice mechanisms, such as truth 
commissions, genocide education programmes and symbolic reparations. However, 
there has been little or no governmental support for any of these initiatives, perhaps 
out of fear that the murky pasts of some members of the government will be 
exposed. It remains to be seen whether Hun Sen, the man who once said Cambodia 
should "dig a hole and bury the past", can summon up political courage and 
encourage a nationwide discussion about the Khmer Rouge years involving all levels 
of Cambodian society, perpetrators, bystanders and victims alike. Only then can 
Cambodia confront the past and look towards the future.  
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